Shinn v. Ramirez (20-1009)

argument 20-1009

Shinn v. Ramirez

Supreme Court of the United States 54 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What statutory interpretation issue does the Court address in Shinn v. Ramirez?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument next in case twenty ten oh

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 0:04

nine, Shin versus Ramirez. Mr Royston? Mr Chief Justice, it may have pleased the court. The issue presented in this case is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation. When Congress enacted twenty two fifty four E two as part of EDPA, it created a high bar for federal evidentiary hearings on habeas claims involving state convictions. It codified the first part of the Keaney test in the opening part of E two by echoing the words failure to develop from Keeney. And this court in Williams and Holland has already held that attorney negligence counts as failure to develop under E two based on agency principles. If a failure to develop has occurred, Congress did not merely repeat Keeney and Coleman's cause and prejudice test for excusing it, but rather supplanted it by specifying in subsections A and B of E two the cause and prejudice required.

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 0:59

Congress thus spoke clearly, and the court's role is to apply the statutory language. That no fact finder could have found the prisoner guilty is not enough. The prisoner must also satisfy E two A by showing either a new rule of constitutional law or that the factual predicate could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. This is an intentionally high bar. Respondents rely on Martinez to create an additional exception to E two beyond A and B. That proposition fails. Martinez was addressing cause for the cause and prejudice test for excusing a procedural default. Congress did not codify the procedural default or the excuses for overcoming it in EDPA. In contrast, Congress did affirmatively codify the circumstances under which cause and prejudice is established to permit an evidentiary hearing following a failure to develop under E two.

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 1:55

Martinez's judge made rule cannot rewrite Congress's statutory questions. Standard. I invite questions from the court.

Clarence Thomas 2:06

Council, um The it seems rather odd that you would we would allow a Um Uh We would excuse uh default under uh Martinez but not allow the prisoner to um make his uh underlying claim uh or develop his evidenti uh evidentiary uh uh basis for his underlying claim.

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 2:36

Well Your Honor Martinez did not consider this question.

Clarence Thomas 2:40

I understand that, but it's not it seems pretty worthless to have uh to say, well you have uh we'll excuse the procedural default. Um to what end?

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 2:52

But in some cases there may already be evidence in the State Court record.

Clarence Thomas 2:55

Okay, let's take this case to what end if you are not allowed to develop the underlying claim?

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 3:01

Well, in this case, our position is that there the court the district court should not have gone into a Martinez hearing uh in Jones without looking whether there was enough state court ev state record evidence to establish an effective assistance of trial counsel in the first place. It's a it's a fruitless exercise, but that doesn't mean that y uh Martinez can overcome the the statutory language. The court should simply cut it off at the beginning. In the Ramirez case, uh the evidence just wasn't there either way. And so um So the the short answer is Martinez can be accommodated. The district court just shouldn't go down the path of of having a Martinez hearing if there's not going to be state court uh evidence uh to establish the ultimate claim.

John G. Roberts 3:41

But it's a basic syllogism. The idea is if you do get the right to raise the claim. For the first time because your counsel was incompetent before. Surely you have the right to get the evidence that's necessary to support your claim. I mean the whole reason some states say you shouldn't raise your incompetence claim until after the direct proceedings is that it is much more efficient and natural to have an evidentiary hearing at that time, rather when you're halfway up the chain between the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Trevor Burrus, Jr. 4:14

I th I think Judge Collins and his dissent uh pointed out the flaw in that logic, which is there's asymmetric intervention here. Congress did specify in the E two when you can have a hearing. So the problem is the major premise of that syllogism is faulty.