Simmons v. Himmelreich (15-109)
argument 15-109Simmons v. Himmelreich
Supreme Court of the United States
48 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the core issue the Court is addressing in Simmons v. Himmelreich?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 15-109, Simmons v. Himmelreich. Mr. Martinez.
MR. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, when an FTCA action is dismissed under Section 2680, the resulting judgment of dismissal triggers the judgment bar for two basic reasons. First, the bar applies to any FTCA judgment, and a 2680 dismissal counts as a judgment under any sensible definition of that term. Second, 2680 dismissals implicate the bar's core purpose, which is to protect the government, its functions, and its employees from the burdens and disruptions associated with multiple lawsuits over the same subject matter.
Meaning, the only claims that are exempted under the Act are Bevin's claims, which are constitutional violations. Why is it that an employee who has committed a constitutional violation is now immune from suit merely because the plaintiff's lawyer made a mistake and didn't file a bevan's claim first. MR.
Your Honor, the core purpose of the judgment bar, as this Court recognized in Will v. Halle, is to protect the government from having to litigate multiple times over the same claim. And so — JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR I don't blame you for that, but you didn't litigate multiple times here. The exemption applied immediately and the case was over.
Oh, with respect, Your Honor, we did litigate multiple times. The FTCA case was brought. It was pending for over three years. The Bevin's
claim was brought shortly thereafter. They were both simultaneously pending before the Court.
Right.
If the Court had elected to address the Bevin's claim first, the bar would have been avoided.
Well, I think the two cases were brought in two different actions. One was brought several months after the other. And the FTCA action, which is the one that obviously Congress was considering when it enacted the judgment bar, was one that took over three years to conclude, counting the three different appeals that the plaintiff took to the court. It still
doesn't answer my point, which is the district court had chosen to answer the Bevins claim first. There'd be no bar in place.
Your Honor, I think that in that case it's true that the Bivens claim, in theory, that the Court could have addressed that. But in most Bivens cases, and in this Bivens case, although it hasn't yet been litigated, the employee is going to raise defenses like qualified immunity and other defenses on the merits. They're going to take a long time for that claim to get resolved. That
just means that we're giving district courts the option to foreclose or close the courtroom door because the work is too hard to get to?
No, not at all, Your Honor. The courtroom door is never closed to the Bivens claim, and the plaintiff could have brought his Bivens claim at the outset. He could have litigated the Bivens claim without bringing the FTCA claim. I think what's important to realize here is that what Congress did when it enacted the FTCA was essentially create a new remedy and offer a bargain toward victims. And it said, look, we're going to create a brand-new remedy directly against the United States for money damages. It's a great deal for you, but if you accept the deal, if you accept the bargain — and you choose to bring an FTCA case and then you choose to litigate that case all the way to judgment, you can't turn around and seek relief under a totally separate claim involving the same facts.
Now, that's a very sensible and fair bargain. And a
claim that could not be brought against the government. I mean, the Bivens claim was specifically saved out of the Westfall Act so that the employee would have a Bivens claim. The Bivens claim is exclusively against the employee. There is no Bivens liability on the part of the government. So if you follow the ordinary rules of claim preclusion, there'd be no preclusion here. Because there was no possibility of bringing the Bivens claim against the government and claim preclusion would apply only to claims that could have been brought. So if you couldn't have brought the Bivens claim against the government, it would have to be a separate claim.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core issue the Court is addressing in Simmons v. Himmelreich?
0:00–7:16
2
How does the judgment bar under § 2680 trigger a “complete bar” to subsequent suits?
7:16–13:24
3
Why does the government argue that a Bivens claim is exempt from the judgment bar?
13:24–18:40
4
What is the significance of the “shall not apply” language in the FTCA’s statutory scheme?
18:40–24:15
5
How do the definitional provisions of the FTCA affect the interpretation of § 2680 dismissals?
24:15–30:29
6
What role do the appellate‑review provisions (Section 412A) play in this dispute?
30:29–35:50
7
How would applying the judgment bar impact practical liability for agencies like the Postal Service?
35:50–43:20
8
What are the parties’ final arguments and the Court’s likely resolution?
43:20–49:02