Smith v. Bayer Corp. (09-1205)
argument 09-1205Smith v. Bayer Corp.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What due‑process rights are required for class certification under Rule 23?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case 09-1205, Smith v. Bayer Corporation. Mr. Monahan.
Mr. Chief Justice, I may please the Court. Petitioners Keith Smith and Shirley Spalazza were not named plaintiffs in the prior Federal proceeding litigated by George McCollins. They never received notice of that prior proceeding. They never received an opportunity to appear and be heard. They never received an opportunity to opt out. and they never received an opportunity to appeal the decision denying class certification. No precedent of this Court would justify treating people as parties under preclusion principles under these circumstances. Recently, in Taylor v. Sturgill, this Court addressed the role against non-party preclusion and discussed the recognized exceptions. The Court in that case discussed
a properly conducted class action as being one of the exceptions. The Court, in discussing these preclusion rules, noted that they are limited by due process concerns, and the Court noted that the properly conducted class action is an exception due to the due process protections incorporated in the Rule 23. Obviously, this Court has discussed the due process protections previously, with class actions in prior cases, particularly those dealing with 23B3 classes, in cases such as Eisen and Schutz. The Court has noted that whenever a class is certified, notice must be provided, the right to — notice must be provided, they must have the right to appear and be heard in person or by counsel, they must have the right to opt out, as well as the protection of adequate representation.
MR. Class action based on diversity is filed in one of the federal districts in West Virginia, and district court denies class certification. The same plaintiff's attorney takes the old complaint, writes in the name of a new-named party, files exactly the same complaint in the other federal district in West Virginia. Would your argument be the same? Back and go forward. get another shot at class certification.
MR. Your Honor, under — yes, under those circumstances, as outlined by — by Your Honor — JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR All you have to do is get a new named plaintiff. MR.
Yes, as long as it's not the same party. If it's a different party, and that — JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR And it can be the same attorney
doing — MR. Yes, it could be the same attorney. This Court noted that in Taylor v. Sturgill, in South Central Bell v. Alabama, and also it was discussed in the Richards case.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR Would the — would the decision that's saying saying Rule 23 standards have not been met, the individual issues predominate over the common issue. Doesn't that deserve some measure of respect when the same thing is tried again?
Yes, Your Honor, but that would be under stare decisis principles, we believe, in that situation, since it is a different party, since it's not the same party itself. And certainly the district courts in West Virginia would look at the other district courts' opinions and would likely render them persuasive or consider them persuasive under those circuits. But
they have no obligation to follow another district court opinion, do they?
Technically, no, Your Honor. If the Fourth Circuit, for instance, had spoken on the matter, though, and it was something that was decided by the Fourth Circuit or, of course, by this court, then clearly they would. And
this one was determined by the multi-district panel, right?
Yes, yes, the district judge in Minnesota. Yes, Your Honor. Interestingly, in Taylor, this court noted that adopting a broad theory of virtual representation based upon an identity of interests, adequate representation, and a close relationship would, in essence, be equivalent to adopting a de facto class action or recognizing a common law class action. without any of the procedural due process protections provided by Rule 23. Obviously, in dealing with these cases, the main reason of certification is — the main reason the due process protection is provided upon certification is to go ahead and justify binding the class members to any judgment issued by the Court at that point.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What due‑process rights are required for class certification under Rule 23?
0:02–7:44
2
How does the Court treat non‑party preclusion in cases like Taylor v. Sturgill?
7:44–15:47
3
When can a state court’s denial of class certification bind a federal proceeding?
15:47–23:01
4
What is the impact of the Anti‑Injunction Act on precluding future class actions?
23:01–31:39
5
How do notice, opportunity to be heard, and opt‑out requirements affect due process?
31:39–40:11
6
Can differing standards for reliance or economic loss create separate preclusion analyses?
40:11–48:19
7
What role does adequate representation play in determining preclusion of absent class members?
48:19–55:15
8
How might Congress‑enacted statutes like CAFA influence class‑certification preclusion?
55:15–1:00:59