Smith v. Berryhill (17-1606)

argument 17-1606

Smith v. Berryhill

Supreme Court of the United States 54 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question presented in Smith v. Berryhill?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in Case 17-1606, Smith v. Berryhill. Mr. Kimberly.

Unknown 0:06

Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court. The Appeals Council's decision in this case, dismissing petitioner's request for review as untimely, was a final decision on his request for benefits. It brought the administrative review process to a close. After the Appeals Council's decision, there was nothing left for the agency to do and the agency's denial of benefits became conclusive and binding. Now, the form and substance of the appeals counsel's decision in this case was a determination that petitioner, by filing his request for review out of time, had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. And the question presented in this case is whether the district court has authority under Section 405G to review that decision.

Unknown 0:54

It did. The question of exhaustion ordinarily arises as a threshold matter, as an affirmative defense in any case challenging agency action, as this Court held in Jones v. Bach. Thus, if the government is not inclined to waive the Appeals Council's determination that a claimant failed to file a timely request for review, the government is free to raise it as an affirmative defense. And the District Court, in turn, of course, has the authority to resolve the merits of that affirmative defense. to either sustain or overrule the government's affirmative defense of failure to exhaust by reviewing the Appeals Council's decision for substantial evidence or otherwise abuse of discretion. What about after a hearing?

Unknown 1:40

Those words also, final decision after a hearing. There's no, as I understand it, there are never hearings before the Appeals Council. There is never a hearing before the Appeals Council, Your Honor, and that's true whether the Appeals Council grants review, denies review, or dismisses. Our understanding of the words after a hearing are that they embody an exhaustion requirement and that the best reading of the word hearing in Section 405G is to give it the same meaning that it has in Section 405B1, which is a hearing before an administrative law judge. And, of course, that is not a bar to review in this case because Petitioner had such a hearing. Now, Amicus's contrary position is that the district court in this case was required simply to take the appeals counsel's word for it, that he had filed his request for review out of time, and that upon the government's raising of that affirmative defense, the district court was to reflexively dismiss the case without considering at all whether the appeals counsel's decision was correct.

John G. Roberts 2:44

Well, it's not take his word for it. It's that there's no judicial review. And if there's no judicial review, that's the end of it. That's not necessarily agreeing or disagreeing. That's appreciating the fact that the legislature has precluded review.

Unknown 2:58

Well, the legislature — I think that would be a departure from this Court's cases indicating that there's a strong presumption in favor of judicial review. Is the Court —

John G. Roberts 3:07

Well, on that, yes, there's normally a presumption. But surely here the presumption is at least — out of the picture, if not overturned, because you have a situation where Congress in general said no review under 405H. It's not the typical case that you get review in this situation. So that ought to be enough to eliminate the presumption.

Unknown 3:27

I don't think that's the right way of looking at 405H, Your Honor. I think what Congress was attempting to do with 405H was make clear that the sole avenue for review of final decisions by the Commissioner of Social Security is a complaint filed under Section 405G. As to the scope of 405G, I think the presumption in favor of judicial review, of course, applies. Any decision that is fairly characterized as a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing ought to be subject to review. And that's particularly in light of Congress's use of the word any in front of final decision. It does not limit it to any particular kind of decision. It does not limit it to decisions on the merits versus decisions based on procedural default.