Smith v. Cain (10-8145)
argument 10-8145Smith v. Cain
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Brady principle and how does it apply to this case?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case ten eighty one forty five, Smith versus Kane. Mr. Sham McGam?
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In Brady versus Maryland, this court established the now familiar principle that the prosecution must hand over all favorable material evidence to the defence before trial. This case presents a flagrant violation of that principle. The Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office produced almost no relevant evidence to the defence before a petitioner's trial. And petitioner was convicted of first degree murder based solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness. Unbeknownst to the defense, however, that eyewitness had told the police on multiple occasions that he could not identify any of the perpetrators, or, as he put it, that he would not know them if he saw them.
The suppression of those statements alone justifies a new trial. But the District Attorney's Office in this case also engaged in the wholesale suppression of statements of numerous other witnesses, statements that further undermined the sole eyewitness identification of petitioner and more broadly cast doubt on petitioner's involvement and role in the shootings. If all of that information had been disclosed to the defense before trial, The jury surely would have viewed this case in a completely different light. The trial court therefore erred by rejecting petitioner's Brady claim, and its judgment should be reversed. In our view, in order to conclude that petitioner is entitled to a new trial here, this court need do nothing more than to consider the suppressed statements of the key eyewitness, Larry Boatner.
Respondent concedes that those statements were withheld from the defence before trial, and argues only that the failure to disclose those statements was not prejudicial. Those statements, however, could not have more clearly contradicted Boatner's confident identification of petitioner at trial.
Well he saw a picture. Boatner saw a picture in the newspaper and that turned on the light for him, right? Wasn't any police suggestion.
That is correct. The basis for Boatner's identification was that he uh saw a n a photograph in the New Orleans newspaper. uh of petitioner. It was in connection with an article uh uh describing the shootings and suggesting that petitioner was one of the suspects in the case and that was what led to his prior identification out of court. But just to be clear, Justice Ginsburg, we're not arguing today that the identification was somehow constitutionally problematic. At most, we're arguing that the identification was of questionable validity in light of the fact that Boatner had only a limited opportunity to see the perpetrators and in light of the circumstances that led to his identification. Now, even if his identification were more clearly reliable, our argument today would be the same.
In a case such as this one, in which the sole basis for linking the defendant to the crime is a testimony of a single eyewitness. And there is evidence uh that the single eyewitness said on multiple occasions that he couldn't identify anyone. We believe that absent extraordinary circumstances, that will be sufficient.
Now my understanding is that he made his first statement to the effect that he couldn't identify anybody at the scene when he had been uh w uh at the scene where five people that he knew very well had been killed. He was lying on the floor with a big gash in his head. He was questioned at the scene and at that time and this was in the evening He said, I can't identify anybody. But then later that very day, wasn't I that very evening. after midnight. He was questioned at the police station. Am I correct? And at that point he gave a description. He did make an I he did provide a description of the person that he said was the one who first came through the door. So, you know, that I I I don't know. And then later he said he th there were statements to the effect that he couldn't identify anybody.
But uh in light of the fact that he did provide a pretty
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Brady principle and how does it apply to this case?
0:00–10:25
2
How do the suppressed statements of eyewitness Larry Boatner affect the trial?
10:25–20:40
3
What evidence suggests the perpetrators were wearing masks and why does it matter?
20:40–29:31
4
How does the court evaluate the materiality of the withheld statements?
29:31–35:55
5
What procedural arguments are raised about the discovery of Brady material?
35:55–42:44
6
How do the parties interpret the standard set by Kyles v. Whitley and related cases?
42:44–48:13
7
What are the implications of the post‑conviction testimony and in‑camera review?
48:13–53:48
8
Why does the petitioner argue that the trial court’s decision should be reversed?
53:48–1:00:09