Sossamon v. Texas (08-1438)

argument 08-1438

Sossamon v. Texas

Supreme Court of the United States 51 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question about “appropriate relief” in Sossamon v. Texas?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument in zero eight fourteen thirty eight, uh Saucaman versus Texas. Mr. Russell.

Paul D. Clement 0:08

Mr. Chief Justice and May, please report. By accepting federal funds for its prisons, Texas consented a suit for appropriate relief for violations of the religious land use and institutionalized persons theft. The question in this case is whether that appropriate relief encompasses damages. If you simply asked what kind of relief is generally appropriate against a state, the answer would be no relief, not even an injunction, because states ordinarily are not subject even to suit without their consent. And so Relupa necessarily asks a more precise question. And that is what relief is appropriate against a state that has consented to be sued for violations of this sort? Damages, for example, are perfectly appropriate against a state that has consented to be sued for breach of contract.

Samuel A. Alito 0:49

How w what would it be, Mr. Russell, if there w there were a suit under Riffra? Um because of federal penal inst institution. was not allowing for the religious practices that the Act protects. It is suited. Under Riffra. Could there be would damages be an appropriate remedy?

Paul D. Clement 1:20

In our view they are, although it is a different context and and and we recognize that the government disagrees with us on that. We can't point to the spending clause contract analogy that applies with respect to spending clause legislation as RIFRA applies to the Federal Government, but there are other indications, including, for example, the long tradition of damages being appropriate relief for the violation of the government. Well

Samuel A. Alito 1:41

can we back up in a minute? You uh you're saying you could get them against the federal government too. But the government doesn't think so.

Paul D. Clement 1:50

That is our view, although we recognize that the Relupa is different in in this respect and that it's a spending clause statute, under which and that this Court's decision, Barnes versus Gorman, makes clear that damages are a traditionally appropriate uh relief for the violation of any spending clause statute. Of course, there's also a tradition uh that damages are appropriate for the violation of civil rights. Uh take statutes like Title six, Title Seven, Title IX, Section five oh four, eight. The list goes on and on, where Congress has created damages as the the quintessential remedy to to enforce civil rights, and when Congress has subjected states to suits under such statutes, it has always put them on equal footing with other defendants and subjected them to damages as well.

Paul D. Clement 2:31

But even beyond uh the But

Unknown 2:32

did it use such language as appropriate relief? Well for example I mean that's the question. Our our cases say it has to be clear to the State. When they when they go into one of these schemes, it has to be clear what liability they're subjecting themselves to. And in these other cases I think it was clear. I don't think it is clear with s simply the word appropriate relief.

Paul D. Clement 2:53

No, we're not saying that the word appropriate relief in itself supplies the clarity. It's looking at that language and the way the court interprets statutes generally, among other things, looking at the tradition of what constitutes appropriate relief for a violation of this sort. And we do think that Barnes versus Foreman is appropriate uh precedent in in telling the court, in telling Texas, what kind of relief is generally thought appropriate to uh satisfy uh Congress's desire to remedy violations of a spending clause statute. We recognize, of course, that Barnes didn't involve sovereign defendants, but the S local governments in that case had the same rights as a state would. It just comes out of the spending clause rather than the eleventh amendment.

Paul D. Clement 3:33

That is, both constitutional provisions prohibit Congress from subjecting s uh defendants to damage suits under spending clause legis legislation without their consent. And this Court has enforced that identical constitutional right The same clear statement test derived from Penhurst versus Holderman. Even more, the contract analogy the Court relied on in Barnes is no less apt simply because one of the recipients is a state.