Southern Union Co. v. United States (11-94)
argument 11-94Southern Union Co. v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What does the Apprendi rule require for facts that increase a penalty?
We'll hear argument next in Case
1194, Southern Union Company v. the United States. Mr. Phillips. MR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. In its landmark decision in Apprendi, this Court announced as a fundamental principle of Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that every fact necessary to increase the punishment beyond that which is otherwise maximally provided for must be presented to the jury It must be decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In this particular case, the defendant was fined a total of an $18 million penalty in the context of a jury finding that there was a single day of violation under the RCRA provision. Congress is quite explicit that the maximum fine for a single day's violation is $50,000.
Was that jury trial constitutionally required? Yes, I believe that jury trial was constitutionally required, Justice Scalia. The cutoff between what's a petty offense not subject to jury trial and what's beyond that, I think you could get there two ways.
Why is a jury trial constitutionally required for the $18 million fine in Southern Union?
This is a crime that Congress attaches a five-year penalty to if it's against an individual, which suggests that it is a very serious crime. And the maximum fine under the district judge's interpretation of this would have been $38 million, even though the judge chose only to impose an $18 million penalty under these circumstances. So I Either way, it seems to me clearly
a serious offense. What have we said is the standard for fines? I'm sorry? What have we said with reference to a jury trial when fines are involved? It has to be a substantial fine? Do we have a word that we
use? Well, you haven't used the word. I mean, the distinction is between a serious offense and a petty offense. And the places where you've drawn the line to conclude that a fine was too small to be worried about was $10,000 in the In Uño's case, he recognized in Bagwell that $52 million was way beyond what would be appropriate under those circumstances. I think the Court benefits most if it just focuses on the potential penalties that Congress has adopted and used that as the guidepost. Because if Congress has said that this is something for which someone could be —
Well, you have to do that because you have to know whether to impanel a jury before the jury comes in with — or before the jury comes in with a penalty, right?
Right, absolutely. And we asserted our right to a jury trial. The government didn't contest our right to a jury trial, and I don't actually read that. Do we
assume for purposes of this case that your client, a corporation, has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial?
I think the language of the Sixth Amendment couldn't be clearer, that it says in all criminal prosecutions the accused is entitled to a jury trial, and Article 3, Section 2 says in all criminal prosecutions there's a jury trial. So there's no effort whatsoever — to limit the individual or in any way the person or persons or entities that are entitled to rights. JUSTICE BREYER- What are the peers of the Southern Union Company
that would sit on the jury? Other railroads?
MR. Well, that would have been — we'd probably have a different outcome if that had been the case. But no, Your Honor, obviously peers in that context is derived from the citizenry in the State of the District in which the prosecution is brought. I mean, obviously, we don't get corporate peers in that sense, but no one has ever doubted that an ordinary jury would be a suitable jury of peers for corporations. And, candidly, corporations are tried all of the time, and no one has doubted it. And I don't think it — you know, first of all, it seems clear under the language of the Sixth Amendment and Article III that corporations are entitled to a jury and that no one is — in anything, that's a serious offense, and that clearly is what we have here.
And so what we've got is a decision — by the jury that there was at a single point in time a violation of RCRA.
Well, it's not — the jury didn't say that the defendant was in violation only one day. Said it was in violation within this span of many months, and it didn't say
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What does the Apprendi rule require for facts that increase a penalty?
0:01–1:09
2
Why is a jury trial constitutionally required for the $18 million fine in Southern Union?
1:09–6:28
3
How do Congress’s statutory maximums for fines affect the Sixth Amendment analysis?
6:28–13:06
4
What historical precedent does United States v. Tyler provide on jury involvement in fine assessments?
13:06–17:46
5
How does the Court’s decision in Oregon v. ICE shape the application of Apprendi to monetary penalties?
17:46–23:05
6
Do restitution and forfeiture fall under the Apprendi doctrine or remain judicial functions?
23:05–33:10
7
Are corporations entitled to a jury trial for criminal fines under the Sixth Amendment?
33:10–52:26
8
What is the Court’s ultimate ruling on whether the fine must be determined by a jury?
52:26–57:23