Stokeling v. United States (17-5554)
argument 17-5554Stokeling v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the Supreme Court’s opening statement about the impact of the 2015 residual‑clause invalidation on Florida robbery offenses?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case 175554, Stokling v. United States. Ms. Brin?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, since the invalidation of the residual clause in 2015, the only way for a state robbery offense to qualify as an act of violent felony is if it has violent force as an element. Florida robbery is... does not have that element because it requires only slight force to overcome slight victim resistance.
So your position is no robbery conviction in Florida counts under the armed career criminal offense. So robbery in Florida is out entirely.
Because of the categorical approach, because the least culpable conduct for robbery in Florida does not require violent force.
Sorry, does that? apply, your answer apply to the armed robbery subsections of the Florida statute?
In the Florida statute, yes, because armed robbery in Florida does not require using or brandishing or displaying or even representing that one has a weapon. It only requires carrying. But in most states that have armed robbery in aggravated robbery offenses that require using, displaying, threatening a weapon, those offenses would qualify because that's a threatened use of violent force. Florida juries are instructed every day in Florida that although resistance is required, no particular degree of resistance is required. A victim can resist to any particular extent. And in fact, the case law in Florida confirms that. that resistance sufficient for a robbery conviction and a penalty up to 15 years in the state penitentiary can involve nothing more than the tightening of one's hand momentarily on a dollar bill before releasing it.
I actually tried that holding since I knew this was your most important case. And I held on to a dollar bill and asked each of my law clerks to try to pull it out of my hand. And I was surprised. I mean, people think, oh, it tears easily. Well, it tears easily if you go like this. But if you're really tugging on it, I mean, I'm not saying nobody could do it, but it requires a lot of force, more than you might think.
I don't think. Your Honor, that it requires a substantial degree of force, as this Court defined that in Curtis Johnson, using the adjectives, all of which connote actual violence, which are severe force, extreme, furious, vehement, strong, and powerful force. Clearly, there is some force
involved. It also said, and this, of course, is a language your friend on the other side stresses, capable of causing physical pain or injury. Um, that covers a broader area than some of the other adjectives that were in the same paragraph.
The, the phrase force capable of causing pain or injury has to be understood in context and it is explaining violent force in the context of a violent felony definition. The court emphasized the word violence by italicizing it. And then the court gave all of these ordinary dictionary definitions that of violence or violent, which are extreme force, vehement, furious force. Do
you think that shoving, grabbing, and pinching count as physical force under ACCA?
Your Honor, the determination under ACCA cannot be made in a vacuum. So there's no category of conduct, I guess we can say, besides stabbing someone in the back directly would involve that. Most conduct has to be viewed In context, for instance, the Court gave the example in ACCA of a slap to the face. In Castleman, they gave the example of a squeeze to the arm. So you have to look beyond the actual category. And one very powerful— Well, I
thought under the categorical approach, you have to look at the category. So I really don't understand why you can't answer that question.
Does
pinching, for example, constitute physical force sufficient to activate ACCA?
The categorical approach actually does not require you to look at a category. It requires you to look at the actual cases and determine what the least culpable conduct for conviction. And that conduct does not exist in a vacuum. Sorry,
we used the example of a tap on the shoulder not being sufficient force. So can you answer Justice Alito's hypothetical?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s opening statement about the impact of the 2015 residual‑clause invalidation on Florida robbery offenses?
0:00–7:30
2
How does the Court define “violent force” under the ACCA’s elements clause and why does a slight‑force Florida robbery not qualify?
7:30–15:47
3
Does a simple pinch or a tap on the shoulder satisfy the “substantial degree of force” requirement for a violent felony?
15:47–23:27
4
What is the categorical‑approach test for the least culpable conduct and how does it apply to Florida’s robbery statutes?
23:27–30:11
5
How many states would be “knocked out” of ACCA coverage if Florida’s narrow definition is applied?
30:11–38:55
6
Why does the Government argue that the residual clause originally covered all robbery statutes and how does its removal change the analysis?
38:55–46:00
7
What was Congress’s intent when it rewrote the ACCA in 1986 and how does that affect the interpretation of robbery as a violent felony?
46:00–53:14
8
What are the final arguments regarding the predictive value of slight‑force robberies and the request to reverse the lower‑court decision?
53:14–1:00:48