Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard (20-1199)
argument 20-1199Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 55m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 9 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What criticisms does counsel raise about Harvard’s use of race under Grutter’s assumptions?
We'll hear argument next in case 2011-99, students for fair admissions versus the president and fellows of Harvard College. Mr. Norris.
Mr. Chief Justice, it may have pleased the court. Grutter assumed that universities could use race in a narrowly tailored way if they just did it like Harvard. But this court never had any evidence about Harvard. Now you do, and that evidence proves that none of Grutter's core assumptions were ever true. First, Grutter assumed that race would only be a plus. But race is a minus for Asians, a group that continues to face immense racial discrimination in this country. Asians should be getting into Harvard more than whites, but they don't because Harvard gives them significantly lower personal ratings. Harvard ranks Asians less likable, confident, and kind, even though the alumni who actually meet them disagree.
What Harvard is doing to Asians, like what it was doing to Jews in the 1920s, is shameful. But it's a predictable result of letting universities use race in highly subjective processes. Second, Grutter assumed that applicants would be treated as individuals, not as members of racial groups. But Harvard gives racial preferences based on the box that applicants check, even if they never write about race or explain how it influences their views. And for competitive applicants, checking the right racial box is an anvil on the admissions scale, worth the same as ultra-rare achievements like winning a national championship. Third, Grutter assumed that universities would seriously consider race-neutral alternatives, but Harvard never once did so until 2017, three years after we sued it.
Harvard now refuses to eliminate its legacy preferences or boost its socioeconomic preferences, even though both changes would make Harvard far less white, wealthy, and privileged. That's how Harvard uses race, and Harvard is supposed to be the model. This court should admit that it was wrong about Harvard, wrong about Grutter, and wrong about letting the poison of racial classifications seep back into education. Grutter should be overruled both for public schools and for private schools that accept federal funds.
Mr. Norris, would you spend some time on the originalism argument that was made at the end of the last case?
Absolutely. So in terms of the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, the best source on this I've ever read is the United States brief on re-argument in Brown. It painstakingly details the legislative history and how the framers of the 14th Amendment saw it as a ban on all racial classifications. Also, everyone knows that the impetus for the 14th Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is a series of bans on racial discrimination. It's a series of colorblind measures and requirements. And then one of the earliest cases this court had before it went off the rails in Plessy was a case called Strouder, where the court immediately recognized that the purpose of this amendment was to eliminate racial classifications, no matter whether they benefited whites or blacks, because racial classifications themselves impose harms.
That's the affirmative evidence. Now, I know that the evidence, the pushback is the post-ratification history. But the post-ratification of the history of the 14th Amendment is not the best evidence, because we know there's massive resistance to the original meaning of the text of the 14th Amendment. but it also doesn't prove anything. Every measure that's cited in Harvard's brief was a remedial measure. It was in response to the end of slavery and the position that black Americans found themselves in. Harvard does not cite a remedial measure for what it's doing today. Those same measures that it cites would not be constitutional today because they would no longer serve a remedial purpose and not a shred of evidence that anyone back then used race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.
Would you have any objection if You do not ask candidates for admission to check a box what their race is, but you are allowed to take into consideration what an applicant would say in an essay about having to confront discrimination growing up and how he or she did that.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What criticisms does counsel raise about Harvard’s use of race under Grutter’s assumptions?
0:00–13:33
2
How does the argument invoke originalism and the original meaning of the 14th Amendment?
13:33–24:54
3
Why does the discussion focus on the admissions “checkbox” and essay‑based race considerations?
24:54–39:04
4
What are the proposed race‑neutral alternatives and why is Simulation D considered inadequate?
39:04–55:33
5
How does Harvard’s data on Asian personal‑rating disparities and overall diversity factor into the case?
55:33–1:09:51
6
What is the significance of the 25‑year “termination” concept from Grutter and how is it applied here?
1:09:51–1:24:58
7
How do the parties argue that diversity benefits society and why might that matter for the Court?
1:24:58–1:41:57
8
What are the final positions on precedent, remedial justification, and the Court’s next steps?
1:41:57–1:55:15