Sykes v. United States (09-11311)

argument 09-11311

Sykes v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 56 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Armed Career Criminal Act and how does it apply to vehicular fleeing?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in case zero nine eleven three three three three three eleven, Sykes versus United States. Justice Ginsburg is not on the bench, but will participate in the argument through the transcripts and the and the tapes.

0:13

Mr.

John G. Roberts 0:14

Marsh?

Mr. Marsh 0:15

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Armed Courier Criminal Act enhances the punishment for possession of a firearm or ammunition for a person who has three previous convictions for a violent felony. This case involves, uh, as you know, vehicular fleeing which Indiana has divided into five categories. Indiana statute uh treats vehicular fleeing as a continuum of behavior ranging from merely failing to stop on the low end, which is the crime, Mr Sykes was convicted of violating uh all the way to Fleeing which results in the death of a police officer on the high end uh which in Indiana is a class A felony. What's in between? The second tier up is what we refer to as B one B, which is fleeing which either causes bodily injury or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury.

Mr. Marsh 1:15

The next category up is fleeing which ca causes serious bodily injury. Fourth category is fleeing which causes a death. We

Unknown 1:27

we can assume that the conviction here did not involve any risk of bodily injury to anybody.

Mr. Marsh 1:36

That's our position, Your Honor. When the court considers the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense uh then that conduct does not involve conduct which creates a risk of bodily injury. Well I'm

Unknown 1:50

sure you'll do so in the course of of your argument, but at at some point uh give us some examples. Of uh violations of of of this of this statute which from a common sense standpoint d don't involve a serious risk. Uh there was something in the briefs about, oh well, the uh defendant might want to just find a safe place to pull over. Uh I I didn't follow that because it's an intent crime. I I just don't see how that would be a violation. But if at some point in your argument you could address that those points.

Mr. Marsh 2:24

I'd be happy to respond now, Justice Kennedy. Uh the court the case he referred to is the Indiana case uh of Woodward from the Indiana sort of appeals in which the Court held that exactly that conduct did violate uh this statute uh because the Knowingly or intentionally, the mens re element goes only to fleeing and using a vehicle. Uh so that was one example of failing to stop.

John G. Roberts 2:51

I'm sorry, looking looking I don't mean to interrupt your answer, but looking for a safe place to stop violates this statute.

Mr. Marsh 2:58

That was the holding of the Indian Court of Appeals, yes. So

Unknown 3:00

you're spoken to stop dead in your tracks and not pull off on the shoulder? I mean I don't I don't I just don't understand that. So I'll go read the case, but

Mr. Marsh 3:08

Well the thing is that the drive in

Unknown 3:09

Indiana, I I think that's uh

Mr. Marsh 3:11

pretty tough. The court did not elaborate, Your Honor, on where the line uh is, but it was

Unknown 3:17

Maybe that's why it why it's a risk. You stop in the middle of the road and then everybody will

Mr. Marsh 3:23

That would be more likely to create uh a risk. But

Unknown 3:26

how can you say somebody's fleeing? I mean, doesn't fleeing mean you're trying to escape the uh The officer?

Mr. Marsh 3:36

Justice Clea, the holding of the Indiana Court of Appeals was in response to a position taken by the defendant uh Sort of along the lines of the the two lines of questioning, which is surely the statute requires something more than merely failing to stop. But the Indiana Court of Appeals used precisely that language. I think the

Samuel A. Alito 3:56

problem with your argument is that the prosecution is not under any obligation to charge any offence greater than the offense for which your client was convicted in a case in which there is a very grave risk created by the flight. Isn't that true?

Mr. Marsh 4:14

The prosecutor is not under any obligation. Was that the question? Yeah. Yes, I think that's uh I think that's correct. So

Samuel A. Alito 4:21

you the fact that someone is convicted of this offense does not show that uh a broad category of offenses within this crime uh lack the the risk that's necessary under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Mr. Marsh 4:37

Well, I suggest that it does, uh, Your Honor, because uh the