Tanzin v. Tanvir (19-71)
argument 19-71Tanzin v. Tanvir
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the core argument about RFRA’s remedy provisions and who can be sued?
We'll hear argument next in Case 1971, Tanzen v. Tanvir. Mr. Kneedler? Mr.
Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, in enacting RFRA, Congress did not subject federal employees throughout the government to a new cause of action for damages in their personal capacity. RFRA's remedy section provides only for appropriate relief against the government. damages against an individual employee in his personal capacity are not relief against the government. At the same time, where a suit is brought against the federal government, including against the federal official in his official capacity, as RFRA provides for, money damages are not appropriate relief. Prior to this Court's decision in Smith and the passage of RFRA, Injunctive relief against a federal agency or official was the only appropriate relief for an asserted free exercise violation.
This court had not recognized the personal damages action under Bivens for a violation of the free exercise clause, and it has not done so since. Moreover, prior to refer, Congress had enacted the Westfall Act, which adopted a broad bar to tort suits against federal employees to prevent the killing effects for the executive branch from the prospect of personal liability and protracted litigation for its employees, Congress has only very rarely departed from that general rule and subjected federal employees to personal damage suits when it has and has done so expressly, which it did not do in RFRA. When Congress enacted RFRA to restore the substantive standard for pre-exercise claims to what it was prior to Smith, it did not at the same time significantly depart from the established remedial scheme.
This court should not now read into the text of RFRA, which provides only for relief against the government, a sweeping new business-style cause of action against federal employees and their personal capacity for damages.
Mr. Kneedler, you rely in your brief on a clear statement rule about the liability that's at issue here. But what is your best case for the proposition that a clear statement rule applies when the question is whether individuals can be liable in their personal capacity rather than in an official capacity?
I think the principle derives from the point I just made about the Westfall Act and more generally Congress's practice with respect to establishing private damage remedies against individuals. federal employees. The general rule is, a statutory rule, is that there is not. And when Congress has departed, it has done so expressly in the few examples cited in the brief. So I think it derives from what Congress itself had done. And because of respect for the executive branch, Congress should not lightly be taken to have intruded upon the executive branch by creating damage remedies against federal employees who are charged with executing the laws. And I think that's specifically, or especially so under RFRA, which is principally designed to create exemptions from generally applicable laws.
An advantage action isn't well suited to that sort of situation because an employee is in the position of having to decide maybe on the spot whether to create an exemption from the generally applicable rule or statute he's charged with implementing.
I think, or I meant to anyway, if I didn't ask for a precedent, and I didn't hear a case name in your answer.
I'm sorry, no, I don't think the court has specifically addressed it, but it has done something analogous with respect to statutes affecting state administration, and the court's Sossaman decision, I think, is constructive in that regard with respect to whether the parallel language in RLUPA of Wade's sovereign immunity of the state. And the court, out of deference to the state and under our federalism, concluded that that language, it's ambiguous and doesn't sufficiently establish a cause of action against the state. And the lower courts have uniformly not allowed damage actions against state employees under RELUPA as well. And we think the respect for the executive branch
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core argument about RFRA’s remedy provisions and who can be sued?
0:00–14:48
2
How does the brief’s clear‑statement rule affect liability for individual federal employees?
14:48–24:05
3
When can money damages be available under RFRA versus only injunctive relief?
24:05–31:49
4
Why does the Westfall Act matter for personal‑capacity suits against federal workers?
31:49–38:41
5
What does “appropriate relief” mean in the context of RFRA and how have courts interpreted it?
38:41–46:17
6
How does qualified immunity limit potential damages claims against FBI agents and other officials?
46:17–53:10
7
How do the Franklin and related precedent cases guide statutory‑remedy analysis for RFRA?
53:10–1:00:37
8
What is the Court’s final position on personal‑damage actions and the remand recommendation?
1:00:37–1:00:52