Terry v. United States (20-5904)
argument 20-5904Terry v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 22m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central legal issue being argued in Terry v. United States?
We will hear argument this morning in case twenty fifty nine oh four Terry versus United States. Mr. Adler?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The United States agrees that craft offenders sentenced under B one C have a covered offense under section four oh four. Statutory text, history, and common sense all compel that conclusion. The textual dispute here boils down to whether Section two modified the statutory penalties for petitioners' crack offense. It did. Because B one C cross references B one A and B, when Section two raised the crack quantities for B one A and B, Section two also modified B one C. That modification expanded the scope of conduct subject only to B one C and it changed the sentencing benchmarks by which B one C offenses are measured. Unable to dispute that modification, Amikus argues that the phrase statutory penalties means a sentencing range, but Section two did not modify any sentencing ranges at all.
It merely raised the crack quantities, and Congress knew that. History confirms that B one C offenses are covered. Shortly after enacting Section two, Congress approved the Sentencing Commission's decision to incorporate Section two into the guidelines for all crack offenders, including B one C offenders. And in the eight years leading up to Section four oh four, the Commission repeatedly used the phrase statutory penalties to refer to the higher crack quantities, not lower sentencing ranges. Finally, Amikus' contrary interpretation would make little sense. It would cover kilogram trafficking kingpins but exclude the lowest level dealers. He has failed to offer any coherent explanation for why Congress would have done that.
After all, Congress did not enact bipartisan criminal justice reform to create new anomalies. It enacted Section four hundred four to purge the taint of the discredited one hundred to one disparity. To do that, it gave all crack offenders sentenced under that old regime an opportunity to seek a reduced sentence under Section two's new statutory benchmarks. I welcome the court's question.
Uh Council, if we extend the first step act into uh subsection C, uh as as you argue we should, uh because you're concerned about the crack cocaine disparity But wouldn't that also extend to other drugs? Because subsection C covers the waterfront, it's not just a crack cocaine provision.
Uh no, Mr Chief Justice, because sections two and three modified the statutory penalties only for crack cocaine violations. The penalties remain exactly the same for every other drug. And um and and Congress, of course, knew that when it was drafting Section 404. It knew that Sections two and three were only about crack cocaine. And that was the purpose of Section 404, was to just make those two provisions retroactive. And so that wouldn't have even been on Congress's radar when it was drafting Section 404. And of course, we have to keep in mind the overall statutory scheme and structure and context here where we're when we're interpreting. Section four oh four. And of course crack cocaine is part of uh the element of the offense um under B one C.
Um and so I just don't think that's a a realistic concern here. And in fact no court in the country has granted Section four hundred oh four relief to a non crack offender, and no court in the country will do so if the court rules in our favor here.
Well you say that's what Congress had in mind, but do you think the statutory language is unambiguous in that respect?
Uh we do we do, Mr. Chief Justice, because the if you look at four hundred four A, the statutory penalties for which uh were modified by section two or three, that is only referring to crack cocaine violations of eight forty one and nine sixty, nothing else. So so it's just not something that is going to happen if the court rules in our favor in this case.
Uh what what's the practical need to uh uh apply the first step act into subsection C given the retroactive sentencing guidelines?
Because uh Mr. Chief Justice, many people, many B one C offenders, like many B ONA and B offenders, did not receive the benefit of the retroactive guideline amendments.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue being argued in Terry v. United States?
0:00–9:55
2
How do the parties define and interpret the phrase “statutory penalties” in the Fair Sentencing Act?
9:55–18:17
3
Why does the example of Terry’s four‑gram crack possession matter for the statutory analysis?
18:17–29:07
4
Does the modification of drug‑quantity thresholds change the sentencing range for offenders?
29:07–38:25
5
How do career‑offender enhancements affect eligibility for resentencing under §404?
38:25–48:35
6
What role does the First Step Act play in making the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes retroactive?
48:35–1:01:05
7
Is there a circuit split on who can seek relief under §404(b) and how is it resolved?
1:01:05–1:10:04
8
What are the parties’ final arguments and the Court’s likely conclusion?
1:10:04–1:22:40