Thompson v. Clark (20-659)
argument 20-659Thompson v. Clark
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 29m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the legal significance of the “favorable termination” rule in Section 1983 claims?
We will hear argument next in case twenty six fifty nine, Thompson against Clark. Mr. Ali?
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Second Circuit holds that a criminal proceeding terminates in the accused's favor only if it affirmatively indicated that the accused is innocent. That is wrong. A criminal proceeding terminates in the accused's favor when it ends and the prosecution has failed to obtain a conviction. As this Court has recognized, Section nineteen eighty three's favorable termination rule protects against parallel proceedings. Inconsistent judgments and collateral attack. That explains why the plaintiff in Heck had to go off and get his conviction overturned on direct appeal, habeas, or through a pardon, and it explains why the plaintiff in McDonough satisfied the rule upon his acquittal.
It also explains why the dismissal of charges terminates the proceeding in the accused's favor. When charges have been dismissed, a civil suit is not parallel to, inconsistent with, or collaterally attacking anything. As the eleventh circuit observed, every circuit to adopt the indications of innocence approach has mistakenly imported it from an unsubstantiated comment in the restatement. With very able counsel, respondent could not come up with any plausible defense of that added inquiry and focuses most of his atten his energy on record specific arguments from the sortiary stage that divert from the question presented. Respondent had a tall order. If he wants to adje inject his additional innocence inquiry into this federal statute, he had to show it was so well settled in eighteen seventy one that Congress would have taken it for granted.
Instead, respondent openly admits that there was no such well settled principle. This court's opinion can end there. Even pretending that respondent could fight to a draw. It would not be a basis for reading his additional inquiry into the statute, and respondent is nowhere near a draw, as the eleventh circuit detailed all jurisdictions except for Rhode Island, adopted petitioner's rule, and understood that the dismissal of charges terminates the proceeding in the accused favour. I welcome the court's questions if there are any.
a malicious prosecution uh case or claim based upon a Fourth Amendment uh seizure. So I don't a s an an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
So this court held in Manuel that there is a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process. And that is the claim that is before this court. And I want to be very clear on this. Petitioner is not asserting a standalone malicious prosecution claim. You know, respondent before this court, now at the merit stage, is asserting some sort of confusion in that respect because respondent used the malicious prosecution label. That is used throughout all of the circuits, as Chief Judge Pryor put it, that's the shorthand for this Manuel claim. So you know we think the court has already decided that the claim exists, Your Honor. But the role that the analogy to malicious prosecution plays in this case is a particular one.
And I'm happy to address that, Your Honor. Yeah. So our position uh Is that the Fourth Amendment does not have a favorable termination element. This is not an argument that we import the elements of malicious prosecution into the Fourth Amendment. But petitioner brought his Fourth Amendment claim, his claim under Manuel, pursuant uh using the vehicle of Section nineteen eighty three. Uh and this court has held that s uh when Congress enacted Section nineteen eighty three. It is reasonable, because it's a species of tort liability, to assume that Congress would have taken for granted certain well-settled common law tort principles when it enacted the statute. And so in uh the the favorable termination rule or the analogy to malicious prosecution in this case takes place for all of the reasons that it took place in McDonough uh and in HEC.
Uh What this court said is that when you were bringing a civil suit which challenges uh the initiation of a state judicial proceeding, uh that the relevant tort you analogize to is malicious prosecution and in particular that the favorable termination rule comes into play under Section nineteen eighty three.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal significance of the “favorable termination” rule in Section 1983 claims?
0:00–12:28
2
How do the parties argue whether a criminal proceeding’s dismissal counts as a favorable termination?
12:28–21:56
3
Why does the Fourth Amendment claim hinge on whether the seizure was pursuant to legal process?
21:56–32:23
4
What role does the common‑law analog of malicious prosecution play in this case?
32:23–43:30
5
How do the courts address the “indications of innocence” requirement versus simple dismissal?
43:30–53:28
6
What are the arguments about the upstream (constitutional) versus downstream (element) questions?
53:28–1:07:27
7
How might the outcome affect future Section 1983 litigation across the circuits?
1:07:27–1:19:03
8
What relief are the parties seeking from the Supreme Court at the end of the argument?
1:19:03–1:29:41