Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP (09-291)

argument 09-291

Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP

Supreme Court of the United States 56 min 4 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What does Section 704A of Title VII prohibit and how is it applied?

John G. Roberts 0:01

So your argument next in case 09291, Thompson v. North American Stainless. Mr. Schnapper.

Ms. Schnapper 0:07

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Section 704A, Title VII, prohibits the use of third-party reprisals as a method of retaliating against a person who complained to the EEOC or otherwise opposed discrimination. The text of Section 704A doesn't limit the types of retaliation which are forbidden. The elements of the statute are unrelated to that. The first requirement is that the plaintiffs show that discrimination occurred with regard to the individual who engaged in unprotected activity. In a case like this, that would be shown by evidence that they singled out Ms. Regalado and Ms. Regalado's fiancée. They didn't go fire anybody else's fiancée. That was the basis on which this particular action was taken.

Ms. Schnapper 1:03

Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was discrimination against the person who engaged in protected activity. That language is easily applicable to a situation where you single out, say, a family member or a fiancé. The purpose of that, the complaint can fairly be read to allege, was to punish the person who engaged in protected activity. There are a number of federal statutes that use the word against in precisely this way. They say that actions cannot be taken to say against a family member of a sitting judge or other federal official where the purpose is to act against the official.

Unknown 1:50

Is Ms. Regalado still engaged to this fellow? She's married.

Ms. Schnapper 1:55

Is she still engaged to him?

1:57

Yes.

Ms. Schnapper 1:57

They're married. Oh, they're married. And they have a lovely two-year-old daughter. Oh, good. Well, why didn't she bring the suit? I think, Your Honor, that this Court's Article 3 jurisprudence would have precluded her from getting any remedy. Certainly, most of the remedies that are needed here. She wouldn't have had Article 3 standing to win an award of a back pay to her now husband. She couldn't have gotten an award of damages to him. But you've got

Unknown 2:30

reinstatement on the grounds that his continuing inability to be employed by the company is an ongoing hurt to her?

Ms. Schnapper 2:42

Perhaps. It would depend on the circumstances. In this particular case, almost certainly not because of just the course of subsequent events. She subsequently left the company at this point. They live nowhere near that account.

Unknown 3:00

Suppose an employer dismisses an employee on an impermissible ground, impermissible under Title VII, and is a very valuable employee. Can the shareholder sue on the ground that the shareholder is now injured because the company is worth less having lost this employee?

Ms. Schnapper 3:19

Sue under Title VII? I don't believe so, Your Honor. I don't believe so. But the situation here is different than that.

Unknown 3:28

Because you start with somebody who is, unlike the shareholders, there's no Title VII violation as to them. Regulato is complaining of sex discrimination, and then she said, because I made a complaint, they — retaliated against me. Shareholders are not in that position because there was no initial charge. No, it's the same hypothetical. We'll just say Regalado, all the same facts, except she's very valuable to the company. The company's now worthless. Shareholder sues.

Ms. Schnapper 4:06

Right. I think the thrust of your question was, are the shareholders like Thompson? And I think the Thompson situation is quite different. He was The very target of the illegal act, the illegality occurs only by means of dismissing him. The question is whether

Samuel A. Alito 4:26

he's aggrieved within the meaning of Title VII, right? That is the other question. And your argument is that if there's injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III of the Constitution, then the person is aggrieved.

Ms. Schnapper 4:40

The court's decision in Traficante goes that far. And in practice, it has not proved a problem under Title VIII. That's generally been under its understanding here. But is it your argument that we should go that far? You do not. We don't need to go that far. You do not need to go that far. Where do we draw the line? Well, I think the government has — I think as far as you need to go, which is not the same as saying that's as far as the law goes, is the standard articulated by the government.