Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP (18-916)
argument 18-916Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 2m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
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What is the statutory framework of § 314(d) and how does it limit judicial review of the Director’s institution decision?
We'll hear argument next in case eighteen nine sixteen Thrive Incorporated versus click to call technologies. Mr Charnas.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The text of the America Invents Act, the statutory history, the statute's policy goals, and this Court's decision in quozo all confirm that Section three hundred fourteen D precludes judicial review of the Director's time bar determination under Section three hundred fifteen D. begin with the text of the statute. Congress drafted the appeal bar to apply to quote the determination whether to institute an interpartis review under this section. Congress could have written Section three hundred and fourteen D to review only the determination whether there was a reasonable uh likelihood. that the petition petitioner would prevail. But Congress wrote the provision more broadly to apply to the institution decision as a whole.
Further, Section three hundred and fourteen itself instructs the Director to look beyond that section. in making the institution determination in at least two ways. First, subsection D instructs the director to quote determine whether to institute an inter parties review under this chapter. And more expressly, subsection A tells the director consider the patent owner's response in determining whether institute review Section three hundred thirteen says the patent owner in that response can present reasons explaining why the petition fails to meet any requirements of the chapter. In other words, the text of the statute makes clear that the institution determination occurs under section three fourteen. based on the prerequisites in the entire chapter.
And because subsection D provides the institution determination cannot be judicially reviewed. The agency's application of those prerequisites located elsewhere in the chapter. cannot be appealed, including Section three hundred and fifteen B. The statutory history confirms this reading. Congress knew how to limit the appeal bar just to the preliminary patentability determination. That is, after all, how it wrote the similar the analogous uh limits on judicial review for ex parte re examinations in former section three hundred and twelve and interparties re examinations in Section three hundred and thirteen. The inner parties reexamination statute, uh former uh three hundred twelve, although now repealed, is particularly instructive.
Like with IPRs, Congress included several prerequisites to institution in former Section three hundred and eleven. But when it wrote the appeal bar It wrote it narrowly focused on quote the determination under subsection A. Subsection A contained the the preliminary patentability standard, which is a substantial new question of patentability. that by writing it that way, Congress excluded from the appeal bar the agency's determination of the statutory prerequisites. With the American Vents Act, however, Congress broadened the appeal bar in Section three hundred fourteen D to apply to the institution decision as a whole. This deliberate drafting decision essentially refutes respondents' reading of the statute.
This reading our reading of the statute is also confirmed by this Court's decision in quozo. Now Quozo dealt with a prerequisite to institution that was not in three hundred fourteen A, it was in three hundred twelve A three, the particularity requirement. Nonetheless, this court held that it was subject to the appeal the board's assessment of the particularity requirement. was subject to the appeal bar in Section three hundred and fourteen D. And it's important to focus on what the court explained w why the court explained it was subject to that. The Court said the appeal bar applies to two different things. It applies to the preliminary patentability determination in three hundred and fourteen A, that is, the Board's assessment about whether
uh it was reasonably likely that the petitioner would prevail. And it also applied, this court said in quozo, at all to statutes that are closely related to the institution decision.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory framework of § 314(d) and how does it limit judicial review of the Director’s institution decision?
0:00–7:38
2
How does the Court’s decision in *Quozo* interpret the scope of the appeal bar under § 314(d)?
7:38–16:37
3
Why do the parties argue that § 315(b) is a “limited forum‑selection provision” rather than a merits determination?
16:37–23:50
4
When can a petition for mandamus be used to challenge a time‑barred institution decision?
23:50–32:00
5
How do the Justices view the separation‑of‑powers concerns raised by precluding review of the Director’s discretion?
32:00–39:08
6
What hypothetical scenarios illustrate the practical effect of the § 314(d) and § 315(b) bars on patent owners?
39:08–47:53
7
How do the parties reconcile the language of § 314(d) with earlier statutes such as former §§ 312 and 313?
47:53–55:28
8
What is the final takeaway on whether Congress intended a broad or narrow reading of the appeal‑bar provisions?
55:28–1:02:37