Tolentino v. New York (09-11556)
argument 09-11556Tolentino v. New York
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What constitutional precedent does the Court cite to define an illegal vehicle stop?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case 09-1155-6, Tolentino v. New York. Ms. Schwartz.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Court held in Delaware v. Prowse that in the absence of reasonable suspicion, it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment for police to stop a car for the purpose of checking the motorist's driving credentials. In Brown v. Texas, the Court similarly ruled that police may not stop a person without reasonable suspicion for the purpose of requiring the individual to identify him or herself. These cases are grounded in the principle that in this country, we enjoy the right to go about our business free from government interference unless or until the police have just cause to detain us. Petitioner's motion to suppress alleged that the police acted exactly as they did in Prowse and Brown.
They stopped the car without justification, elicited his name, and gained access to his DMV records, which otherwise would not have been discovered. Instead of suppressing the poisonous fruit of the illegal car stop, the DMV records, the prevents application of the exclusionary rule whenever the police act in violation of Prowse.
Was the poisonous fruit the DMV records? Or was the poisonous fruit the fact that this person who is contained in the records was the one driving the car? Why wasn't that the fruit? I mean, the records were there anyway. What new information came from the stop? was the fact that that is the person who was driving the car. Why wasn't that what should have been suppressed?
Well, Justice Scalia, that is also a fruit of the poisonous tree. And I'd agree with you on
that fruit. Did you ask for that to be suppressed?
Yes, that was asked for in the motion at the trial level.
But
that's not what's
before us here, right?
That's right. And that's because the Court, deciding the case, only addressed the DMV record and indicated that the DMV records were not properly suppressible fruit. And that's the issue.
Suppose that you had won at the trial level. The judge had won. suppresses everything and dismisses the indictment. And Mr. Tolentino walks out of the courtroom and is observed by the officer who conducted the stop in this case. The officer sees him getting into a car and driving away, even though his license is still suspended. Now, could he be arrested for that?
Yes, Justice Alito, he could.
Even though the officer would have no reason to know that this particular person has a suspended license, were it not for the chain of events that followed from the initial allegedly illegal stop?
Well, although that initial stop provided the tainted information that he didn't have a license, the subsequent reoffense would certainly taint the illegality of the first stop and make the second offense.
All right. Let me ask you a related question. Suppose that after you filed your suppression motion, the, the State of New York became nervous about this issue and they checked all the surveillance cameras in the vicinity of the stop and lo and behold, they found a tape showing Mr. Tolentino driving the car shortly before the stop here? Could he be prosecuted for illegal drive — for driving without a license, with a suspended license, using that evidence?
Well, that — I believe that under those circumstances, it would be entirely proper to prosecute the case with that. That would be evidence that came from an independent source.
Well, I mean, in light of those two answers, it does seem to me that Your real problem here is not with the DMV records. It's with the police officer's observation after the stop that Mr. Tolentino was driving a car.
Well, Justice Alito, again, there's lots of evidence that could be properly the fruit of the poisonous tree. There was a statement made here that the petitioner said that he did not have a New York State license. There's the observations of the officer, and there's the DMV records. They're all properly considered fruit. And in this case, the DMV records are of important evidentiary significance.
Is there any case in this Court —
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional precedent does the Court cite to define an illegal vehicle stop?
0:02–8:55
2
Why are the DMV records considered “poisonous fruit” of the unlawful stop?
8:55–15:13
3
Can the police observation that the defendant was driving be suppressed as evidence?
15:13–22:46
4
How does the attenuation doctrine affect the admissibility of evidence discovered after the stop?
22:46–31:33
5
When does a government record become “independent” of an illegal search?
31:33–38:16
6
Is impounding the vehicle a permissible response to a stop without reasonable suspicion?
38:16–45:54
7
Does a suspect’s identity (name) have a special status that prevents suppression?
45:54–51:17
8
What is the Court’s final position on applying the exclusionary rule in this case?
51:17–1:01:04