Torres v. Lynch (14-1096)

argument 14-1096

Torres v. Lynch

Supreme Court of the United States 59 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central issue the Court is addressing in Torres v. Lynch?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next this morning in case fourteen ten ninety six, Torres versus Lynch. Mr. Goodanio.

Joseph W. Guadagno 0:08

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Congress made a choice. Congress did not choose to make generic arson an aggravated felony. Instead, Congress chose to make Federal arson an aggravated felony. And that makes sense. The Federal Arson statute has a minimum sentence of five years. There are at least 18 states with arson offenses that are classified as misdemeanors. Arizona and Colorado have misdemeanor arson offenses involving Damage to property worth less than $100. Congress would not have wanted to make such minor offenses aggravated felonies. We know this because of the statutory scheme. Within the Aggravated Felony Statute, we have generic offenses, very serious ones like murder and rape.

Joseph W. Guadagno 0:54

There are no sta uh there are no sentence requirements for those very serious uh generic offenses. However, for the remaining generic offenses that are that are listed in the Aggravated Felony Statute, they are associated with a sentence of a year or more. Theft offenses, obstruction of justice, burglary, they will require a sentence of a year or more. Also listed with among the generic offences is crime of violence. There's a requirement of a sentence of a year or more. Arson uh is a crime of violence. Uh and so Congress would have realized that that arson offenses would would fall under the crime of violence provision. And for more serious State arson offenses, they would fall under this provision. So that uh for the minor arson offenses, where there is a sentence of less than a year,

Joseph W. Guadagno 1:52

I the individual would would not be an aggravated felon and would be eligible for discretionary relief. But

Unknown 1:59

your reading leaves out some very serious arson offenses, say under foreign law or under state law. it could be uh uh the worst kind of arson, but there's no commerce Hooker. And so it would be left out. On your reading.

Joseph W. Guadagno 2:19

But but but our on our on our reading, while while it wouldn't fall under under the the the E provision in the aggregated felony statute, the these more serious arson offenses, the State and Foreign Offenses, they would fall under the F crime of violence provision where there is a sentence to a year or more. And under under that approach, these less serious arsons would would not And in and individuals like like my client, Mr. Luna, who only received a sentence of one day, they would would be eligible to receive cancellation of remote. You

Samuel A. Alito 2:53

think that's still clear after our decision in Johnson?

Joseph W. Guadagno 2:58

Johnson, if I if I remember correctly, dealt dealt with with with sixteen sixteen B. He could still one could still be an aggravated felon under under sixteen A, but but regardless, what I'm talking about is But what you

Samuel A. Alito 3:12

relying is la uh you're relying on language that is similar to, maybe and and maybe different in a in an important respect, but nevertheless bears some similarity to the residual clause in the armed criminal uh Ar armed career criminal act, does it not

Joseph W. Guadagno 3:28

Yes. Uh um C I'm talking about what Congress intended. When Congress write writes a law, it doesn't intend for for for the Supreme Court to find the language ambiguous and and and and sh and strike it down. So so that We should be looking at what Congress's intent was, not not not whether or not uh crime of violence will still be uh an aggravated felony af after Johnson. Uh if if if there are problems with this, that will be that'll be for Congress to fix.

Samuel A. Alito 4:00

May I ask you about the statutory language that seems to me to present the greatest problem for your position. Maybe it's not fatal, but uh what I'm referring to is the provision that says the term applies so we're looking at whether uh The the state offense here is described in the Federal Arson statute. And then there's language that says the term applies to an offense described in this paragraph, whether in violation of Federal or State law. What do you make of that? The it can be argued that what that means is that when you have a Federal offense with a jurisdictional provision