Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety (20-603)
argument 20-603Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 41m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What constitutional basis does the government cite for allowing private suits against states under USARA?
We'll hear argument this morning in Case 2603, Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety. Mr. Tutt.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The Constitution gave Congress the power to raise and support armies, and the reason for that grant was to ensure the survival of the nation. The Constitution provided Congress with the tools necessary to fulfill its preeminent national defense function, and the ability to authorize lawsuits, including suits against the states themselves, are among those vital tools. I'd like to make two additional points this morning.
Thank you.
First, the war powers, including the Army and Navy clauses, are unique and fundamentally different from the Constitution's other grants of power. Unique textually, unique structurally, and unique historically. The states could not have read the Constitution, seen the federal structure it created, and believed they would retain sovereign authority to interfere with the federal government's preeminent national defense function. Second, USARA's protections are crucial in light of the structure of the modern military. At the turn of the 20th century, it became apparent the United States would be required to wage war on a global scale and at a moment's notice, and that this would require an immense fighting force.
Rather than create a massive peacetime standing army, the United States instead created a reserve component, trained soldiers who would keep their civilian jobs but would be ready to respond at a moment's notice to unpredictable global threats. To convince soldiers to join that force and to ensure that soldiers in it would be willing to risk significant injury without hesitation, Congress promised these soldiers that they would not be discriminated against on the basis of their military service or service-connected injuries. And the cause of action that makes its rights real is not a tangential or peripheral exercise of the war powers, but a core exercise of the United States' power to raise and support its army to fulfill its indispensable first task, protecting the national security.
I welcome the Court's questions.
Counsel, what do you do about our — decision in Allen, which seemed to suggest that CATS, on which you rely, was quite specific and limited to that context.
Your Honor, Allen does say that typically this is a limited — that sovereign immunity is limited. But as Allen pointed out, Allen is about abrogation not a plan of the convention waiver. I would also point out that Alan acknowledged
that — I don't quite understand the distinction that you're making between those two things. Could you explain that, why you think that these are in two separate buckets? —
Well, the Court has explicitly treated them as separate buckets, Your Honor. In Penny, the Court made clear that abrogation, the taking away of sovereign immunity, is something distinct from a waiver in the plan of the Convention. And so — and I could speak more to that. But that, I think, that it is a distinction in this Court's precedence, and it's an important distinction. The 14th Amendment permits abrogation. None of the Article I powers have been found to permit abrogation. But — The eminent domain power and the bankruptcy power have both been found to be plan of the Convention waivers because the Federal — yes, Your
Honor. Well, Mr. Tutt, both the eminent domain power and the bankruptcy power are inextricably intertwined, to use Paniste's language, with judicial proceedings. I mean, the eminent domain power — there was evidence that the United States had delegated this power to private parties since the beginning — And the way to accomplish eminent domain is through a condemnation action. Similarly, with bankruptcy, bankruptcy proceedings are tied to litigation. And that is obviously not true of the war power. Litigation is not its central office. So why isn't that a distinction here?
First, I would say that I think eminent domain is not necessarily inextricably intertwined with judicial proceedings.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional basis does the government cite for allowing private suits against states under USARA?
0:00–12:56
2
How do the parties distinguish between abrogation and a plan‑of‑the‑Convention waiver?
12:56–24:04
3
Why is the war‑powers clause considered unique compared to other Article I powers?
24:04–36:42
4
What historical evidence do the advocates use to show states gave up sovereign immunity for war‑related actions?
36:42–49:07
5
How does the Court evaluate the relevance of the Indian Commerce Clause and the Seminole Tribe precedent?
49:07–1:02:09
6
What arguments are made about the practical impact of allowing veterans to sue state employers?
1:02:09–1:15:31
7
How might extending the war‑powers waiver affect other constitutional powers like the coinage or commerce clauses?
1:15:31–1:28:05
8
What final conclusions does each side seek from the Court regarding sovereign immunity and the war‑powers clause?
1:28:05–1:41:04