Trump v. United States (23-939)
argument 23-939Trump v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
2h 39m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 9 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What arguments are presented about presidential immunity and its historical basis?
We will hear argument this morning in case twenty three nine thirty nine, Trump versus United States. Mr. Sauer?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Without presidential immunity from criminal prosecution, There can be no presidency as we know it. For two hundred and thirty four years of American history. No president was ever prosecuted for his official acts. The framers of our constitution viewed an energetic executive as essential to securing liberty. If a president can be charged, put on trial, and imprisoned for his most controversial decisions as soon as he leaves office, That looming threat will distort the President's decision making precisely when bold and fearless action is most needed. Every current president will face de facto blackmail and extortion by his political rivals. While he is still in office.
The implications of the court's decision here extend far beyond the facts of this case. Could President George W. Bush have been sent to prison for obstructing an official proceeding or allegedly uh lying to Congress to induce war in Iraq? Could President Obama be charged with murder for killing US citizens abroad by drone strike? Could President Biden someday be charged with uh unlawfully inducing immigrants to enter the country illegally for his border policies? The answer to all these questions is no. Prosecuting the president for his official acts is an innovation with no foothold in history or tradition and incompatible with our constitutional structure. The original meaning of the executive vesting clause
The framers understanding and intent. An unbroken historical tradition spanning two hundred years, and policy considerations rooted in the separation of powers all counsel against it. I welcome the court's questions.
Uh Mr. P Sau, to to your last point, could you be more precise as to the source of this immunity?
The source of the immunity is principally rooted in the uh executive vesting clause of Article two, Section One.
How does that happen?
Uh that that i the source of it, uh Justice Thomas, I think is, as you described in your separate opinion in Sivotowski, for example, that the Executive Vesting Clause does not include only executive powers laid out explicitly therein, but encompasses all the powers that were originally understood to be included therein. And Marbury against Madison itself provides strong evidence this kind of immunity, a broad principle of immunity that protects the President's official acts. from scrutiny, direct sitting in judgment, so to speak, of the Article three courts i that that matches the original understanding of the executive.
How exactly would we determine uh uh what the of what an official act is.
Uh I'd say I point the court to two cases for that. Obviously Fitzgerald against uh uh Nixon is the best uh guidance that the court gives where it the course court adopted the outer perimeter test. And this court engaged in analysis the analysis there that's very instructive here, where it looked at the level of specificity at which the acts are described uh in in that case a civil case here it would be the indictment.
What if you have um let's say The official act is appointing ambassadors, and the President appoints a particular individual to a country, but it is in exchange for a bribe. Somebody says I will give you a million dollars if I am made the ambassador to whatever. How do you analyze that? That I think would fall under this court.
Court's uh discussion in Brewster, where the court held with respect to legislative acts that bribery is not an official act, which also matches the court the common law background. So I the way that this court in Brewster kind of sliced at the joint was to say accepting the bribe and the agreement to sex the bribe are not official acts. That's private conduct or subsequent appointment would not be would be an i essentially an unrestrictable power of this court that Congress couldn't directly regulate.
It is not accepting the bribe isn't an official act, but appointing an ambassador is certainly within the official responsibilities of the President.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What arguments are presented about presidential immunity and its historical basis?
0:00–6:00
2
How do the parties illustrate the distinction between official and private acts with bribery examples?
6:00–11:59
3
What criteria are proposed for determining whether an action qualifies as an official act?
11:59–20:48
4
How do the justices address impeachment and constitutional checks on presidential criminal liability?
20:48–1:18:57
5
What arguments are made about the President’s access to legal advice from the Attorney General?
1:18:57–1:35:50
6
How do the parties distinguish between official (core) presidential powers and non‑core actions in the bribery and fraud statutes?
1:35:50–2:01:26
7
Do motives or personal political goals affect the analysis of presidential immunity and criminal liability?
2:01:26–2:26:24
8
What conclusions are drawn about the proper limits of presidential immunity and the role of the courts?
2:26:24–2:39:17