Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. (20-915)
argument 20-915Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 18m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What mental state must a copyright applicant have to trigger the knowledge requirement in §411(b)?
We'll hear argument next in Case 2915, Unicolors v. H&M Henson Moritz. Mr. Rosenkranz.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The question here is what state of mind a copyright infringer must prove to establish that an applicant included inaccurate information, quote, with knowledge that it was inaccurate, quote, The answer is that it requires subjective awareness. Of what? Of the inaccuracy itself. The same standard applies whether the inaccuracy was because the applicant misunderstood the law or misunderstood the facts or included a typo. Simply put, you don't have information, excuse me, you don't know that information is inaccurate if you honestly believe it to be accurate. The safe harbor of Section 411B does not suggest an exception when that belief exists because you did not predict where the law would go or you did not know how the law applies to the facts.
This Court can get to that result through two separate routes. The first is the plain text, and the second is a presumption. No Court in a century had invalidated a copyright registration based upon the an innocent legal error, and Congress is presumed not to have radically changed that rule by hiding that change in the word knowledge. Like the courts, Congress considered it more important to give authors and artists an effective remedy against IP thieves than it was to demand perfect compliance with complex legal requirements in a form. The Ninth Circuit's rule will wreak havoc. Every time a court decides an unsettled question of law, it would cast doubt on the validity of countless registrations. Now, there are three specific points to make about the text here.
The first is that Section 411B starts with a default rule that a registration is valid, quote, regardless of any, any inaccurate information. So that means without regard to whether that information is a fact or a legal conclusion. Second, Section 411B is pretty unique among the statutes that this Court has encountered in the past. in that it's not requiring knowledge of several elements and all you have to do is figure out which one needs to be knowing. But here it requires knowledge of something very specific. It inquires knowledge that the information reflected in the application is wrong. Not knowledge of what happens to be right or wrong in the world outside the application. Not knowledge of things that might help you figure out
that the application is wrong, not the ability with reasonable diligence to figure out whether the application is wrong, but knowledge that there is wrong information on the application. If you don't have that knowledge, the belief of a wrong thing on the application, you don't have what Section 411B requires, period. Nothing in this statute suggests that it matters one bit why you don't have that knowledge.
Well, but at the beginning, I'm looking at page 30 to 31 of your brief, and you're talking about the copyright office. And you say this good faith has to be based on, or they say, the good faith has to be based on a reasonable interpretation of the law.
So, Your Honor, the government, of course, will respond to what the Copyright Office meant there. We were quoting it for the rejection of the legal — of the rule that there's an exception for law, not for that reasonableness insert. They weren't doing an exegesis of 411B. They were just rejecting the proposition that there is a carve-out for reasonableness or a constructive — a constructive knowledge requirement. I was saying there were three points.
Can I follow up on that point? Of course, Your Honor. In the SG's brief, page 21, footnote 3, the last sentence, they deal with reasonableness and say, although Section 411B does not impose a freestanding reasonableness requirement, the unreasonableness of a registrant's purported view of the law may support an inference that the view was not sincerely held. Do you agree with that?
I do, Your Honor, in two ways. First, knowledge always in a statute incorporates willful blindness. That's the backdrop.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What mental state must a copyright applicant have to trigger the knowledge requirement in §411(b)?
0:00–10:45
2
How does the Ninth Circuit’s rule on knowledge differ from the statutory text?
10:45–22:16
3
Why does the Court distinguish between factual mistakes and mistakes of law in copyright registrations?
22:16–35:20
4
What is the “single unit of publication” rule and how does it affect group registrations?
35:20–44:40
5
Does the statute require actual knowledge, constructive knowledge, or willful blindness?
44:40–53:02
6
Is there a circuit split on the interpretation of §411(b) and how might it be resolved?
53:02–59:28
7
What policy arguments exist for and against allowing innocent legal errors in copyright applications?
59:28–1:08:26
8
What are the practical implications of the Court’s decision for copyright owners and alleged trolls?
1:08:26–1:18:10