Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall (12-99)
argument 12-99Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the legal significance of “pre‑certification” agreements in labor organizing?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case 1299, Unite Here Local 355 versus Mulhall. Mr. McCracken.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Many employers and unions find agreements such as this useful to avoid conflict during organizing campaigns. They are efficient. They avoid the hard feelings that come in many contested organizing campaigns and thereby create a good environment for collective bargaining. They serve the core objectives of the Labor Management Relations Act, those being freedom of contracts, organizing employees for collective bargaining, and labor peace.
I think there's substantial force to that argument. But can we talk just about property for a minute, just in the abstract? Isn't it true that what you have might become property when you trade it? If you take a picture of a celebrity on the street, that's your right to do so, but you can't sell it. Maybe that's not quite the right analogy. But here, what — as you point out, is fairly standard in labor relations, has been turned into property, arguably, by the parties. Could the parties say that we'll pay you – could the employer say we'll pay you $100,000 to get out of the recognition agreement? That would be property in an economist's sense. Now, it might be a violation of the Labor Act.
That example would definitely be a violation of Section 302. If the employer gave the union $100,000 to not organize, that would be exactly like the Ventimiglia case from 1957 in the Fourth Circuit.
But in the abstract, wouldn't that be property?
Money is property.
We don't dispute that. And isn't the thing that's exchanged for the money also property?
This statute focuses on what is Paid lent or delivered by the employer — I'm just talking about
our common definition, our common agreement as to what property
means. In this case, the only thing given by the union was a promise not to strike, picket, or boycott this business, to help supply labor if the employer needed it, not to coerce or threaten employees in the course of the organizing effort, and to arbitrate in the event that there was any —
And the list of — the list of employees.
Yes, that's what the employer promised to give to the union. And I was describing the things the union gave in response because it was a mutual
agreement. What about support of the legislation to permit slot machines? Was that a promise that the union made?
It's so alleged, and there's no question that the union did tell the employer and the other employers that it would work to pass the legislation necessary for these employers to get into business in the first place, thereby serving the their interest and also the union's interest in having an industry and workers in the industry to represent.
But as the case comes to us, we assume that there was such a commitment by the union. Yes, Your Honor. Okay. So suppose the company manufactures widgets and the union says we'll spend $100,000 advertising your widgets if you sign the recognition agreement.
Yes. Is that
lawful?
It would be lawful because the union would not have received any widgets or It would not have received any kind of property from the employer. It would simply have promised to help the employer in business, something that happens a great deal in labor relations.
Well, there would have been a quid pro quo for that, certainly. I mean, the union wouldn't promise that for nothing. it would get something in exchange, such as, as in this case, the right to go on the employer's property to recruit union members or some other thing of value from the employer.
Unquestionably. And this, as I say, happens a lot. So why
isn't that the property that Justice Kennedy referred to? The union paid $100,000 — to get the items that the employer gave them. So aren't they valued, something tangible, valued for what the union paid for it?
They are desired by the union. That does not make them things of value that are paid, lent, and delivered by the employer to the
union. Well, the argument, as Justice Scalia and Kennedy are referring to it,
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal significance of “pre‑certification” agreements in labor organizing?
0:01–7:59
2
How do the parties define “thing of value” under Section 302 of the Labor Act?
7:59–15:31
3
Why might a $100,000 political‑campaign payment be considered a violation of Section 302?
15:31–23:54
4
What historical cases show that pre‑certification agreements date back to the 1970s?
23:54–32:16
5
How do courts treat employer‑union promises of access, neutrality, and employee lists?
32:16–40:31
6
Does the expiration of the agreement affect standing and injunctive relief?
40:31–46:57
7
How does the interplay between Section 302 and the NLRA shape the Court’s analysis?
46:57–52:54
8
What are the arguments for and against treating organizing assistance as a prohibited “gift”?
52:54–1:00:47