United States v. Hansen (22-179)

argument 22-179

United States v. Hansen

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 22m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the statutory basis of the United States v. Hansen case?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 0:01
next in Case 22-179, United States v. Hansen. Mr. Fletcher? Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. For more than a century, Congress has made it a crime to encourage or induce certain immigration offenses. Mr. Hansen violated that statute by inducing noncitizens to reside in the United States illegally so that he could take their money in a fraudulent citizenship scheme. No one suggests that that conduct was protected by the First Amendment. But the Ninth Circuit invoked the overbreadth doctrine to facially invalidate this long-standing statute by giving the words encourage and induce their broadest possible meaning and sweeping in wide swaths of protected speech. Now, we haven't argued that the statute would be constitutional if it swept that broadly.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 0:44
Our position here is that the statute need not and should not be read that way. Everyone agrees that in criminal law, the terms encourage and induce are terms of art that can refer narrowly to soliciting or aiding and abetting unlawful activity. And as nine dissenting judges explained below, text, context, and history confirm that the words carry that traditional meaning in the context of Section 1324. At the very least, that's a plausible reading of the statute that ought to be adopted under the canon of constitutional avoidance because it would eliminate any overbred concern. Prohibitions on soliciting or facilitating both criminal and civil violations have long been common and have never been thought to raise a First Amendment problem because, as the Court held in Williams, the First Amendment does not protect speech that is intended to induce or commence specific illegal activities.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 1:33
Now, I acknowledge that it will sometimes be hard to draw the line between protected advocacy and unprotected solicitation. But that problem is not unique to Section 1324. Exactly the same issue can arise under any solicitation or aiding and abetting statute. And more importantly here, that is not an overbreath problem. As with other solicitation and aiding and abetting statutes, the possibility that some applications of Section 1324 might raise First Amendment questions may provide a basis for future as-applied challenges, but it does not justify facially invalidating the statute and preventing its application to plainly unprotected schemes like Mr. Hansen's. I welcome the Court's questions.
Clarence Thomas 2:13
Are you aware of any instance in which this section has been applied in the way that the Ninth Circuit hypothesized?
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 2:20
I'm not. And I really do think that's significant, Justice Thomas. We are, after all, here on an overbred case, and this Court has emphasized most recently in the last time it heard this issue in Sen. Smith that overbred is strong medicine that ought to be applied only as a last resort. And it said you have to vigorously enforce the limits on that doctrine.
Elena Kagan 2:38
Sorry, there's a district court case involving the woman who encouraged her housekeeper to Or told her, if you leave, you can't come back, which was an accurate statement of the law, and she was prosecuted in that case?
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 2:59
Justice Sotomayor, you're referring to the Henderson case out of the District of Massachusetts, which is the case that the amicus briefs focus almost entirely on. And I think even if you were troubled by that case, that would be one district court prosecution.
Elena Kagan 3:11
I don't think Fodderford— that if he, that what the consequences were of leaving, that you would prosecute the lawyer too. And the lawyer there is earning money for that statement.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 3:30
He's
Elena Kagan 3:30
giving advice.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 3:31
I'm not sure whether that's what the government said there. It's certainly not what we're saying now. Well, I
Elena Kagan 3:35
know you are. But could you tell me exactly how you want us to rewrite the statute? I think if you're going to call it aiding and abetting or soliciting, that you have to write in a specific intent, don't you?
Elizabeth B. Prelogar 3:49
I wouldn't — I'd just dispute the premise. I don't think we're asking you to rewrite it. I think we're saying these are words that connote aiding and abetting.

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