United States v. Haymond (17-1672)
argument 17-1672United States v. Haymond
Supreme Court of the United States
56 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the constitutional issue with revoking supervised release under § 3583(e)(3)?
We'll hear argument first this morning, Case 17-1672, the United States v. Heyman. Mr. Fagan.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. There's no dispute that the District Judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent possessed child pornography was constitutionally sufficient to revoke his supervised release and re-imprison him under Section 3583E3. The Court of Appeals... Are there any other... area of the law in which we permit imprisonment by a preponderance of the evidence. Well, Your Honor, there are areas where, I mean, that are precisely analogous to this, for example, parole and probation, revocation. Well, in parole, the original sentence was already X number of years. And the State granted a benefit and said, instead of serving 10 years, we'll let you serve eight if you behave.
If you don't, you've got to finish serving the two that we imposed originally. But where do we ever permit someone to be jailed for an additional period of time other than their original sentence? on a preponderance of the evidence. There was no jail for an additional period of time here. Petitioner's original sentence, which was authorized by the jury's verdict, included a 10-year period of supervised release, which is precisely analogous to a 10-year term of automatic parole. His re-imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised release was only five years, which is less than the 10-year... That's almost like harmless error argument. If his term... There's no question now that his term of supervisory lease extends further than his original sentence, no?
Your Honor, it does not extend further than his original sentence. Well, his jail sentence does. No, Your Honor, it does not. His original sentence was 38 months of imprisonment, which he served, to be followed by 10 years of supervised release. On revocation, he received a five-year term of re-imprisonment to be followed by five further years of supervised release, an exchange of 10 for 10. The Court was clear and morsy against Brewer, where it held that a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt is not required for parole revocation and that a defendant whose parole is revoked doesn't get credit for time he spent out in the community on parole. The circumstances of this case are precisely analogous. But we're still back to the same — we're still — no, it's not quite.
Because he was sentenced originally to the 38 months, not to another term of jail. Now we're adding on to that an additional term of incarceration and an additional term of supervised release. So we've stretched the maximum of his earlier term. Your Honor, I don't think we have any more than would be true under a parole system. Well, you're trying to mix, to compare apples and oranges. In the parole situation, the original sentence was the additional sentence that he got. Here, he only got the 38 months. A jury didn't find facts sufficient to give him the additional years he received by the judge's finding. Well, let me say — Two things about that, Justice Sotomayor. The first is that his original sentence, if you look at the judgment, does include the 10 years of supervised release.
He was fully aware that supervised release could be re-invoked and he could be re-imprisoned for violating its conditions. And that is, in fact, what happened here. Well, let's talk about this. Could Congress impose a system that says, on the day of sentencing, you're going to be sentenced to X number of years? But if a judge finds that you committed X act, you can be sentenced to, instead of 38 months, to eight years. Can a judge do that under a Prendi? Well, Your Honor, I'd need to know a little bit more about — Not a charged crime. It's just an act. Whatever the act may be. So, Your Honor, if your question is, can a judge impose a sentence that says you'll, for example, spend five years in prison and then there'll be some period after that during which if you — a judge finds if you commit a certain
act — No, no, no. We know under a prendi — I think it's pretty clear under a prendi that if the sentence says you committed X crime, you get five years —
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the constitutional issue with revoking supervised release under § 3583(e)(3)?
0:00–6:27
2
How do the parties compare supervised‑release revocation to parole and probation revocation?
6:27–11:43
3
Why does the Court examine whether a judge‑found fact increases the authorized sentencing range?
11:43–18:52
4
What role do the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi‑type rules play in this case?
18:52–27:00
5
How do the parties argue the difference between § 3583(k) and § 3583(e)(3) affects due‑process rights?
27:00–34:39
6
What are the arguments about mandatory minimums and the possibility of life‑without‑parole sentences?
34:39–42:10
7
Why do the Justices discuss whether a jury trial should be required for revocation hearings?
42:10–49:02
8
What is the Court’s ultimate question about the constitutionality of the statutory scheme?
49:02–56:10