United States v. Miller (23-824)
argument 23-824United States v. Miller
Supreme Court of the United States
53 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What is the core dispute over Section 106A’s waiver of sovereign immunity in United States v. Miller?
We'll hear argument next in case twenty three eight twenty four, United States versus Miller. Ms. Dubin.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may I please the court. The bankruptcy code g grants trustees an array of avoidance powers, including the power to avoid fraudulent transfers under Section five forty eight, subject to a two year federal look back period. This trustee's claim is time barred, so he's relied on a different code provision, Section five hundred forty four B. But five forty four B has no application here. That provision looks to whether a real world creditor can avoid a transfer under state law with a longer look back period. Rather than leave that right to one creditor, Congress authorized the trustee to pull it into bankruptcy to benefit all creditors. But five hundred forty four B doesn't come into play unless a transfer is already avoidable under state law.
Five forty four B simply allows the trustee to piggyback off that existing vulnerability. In practice, that means five forty four B has a two level structure. The trustee must first identify a creditor with the right to avoid the transfer under state law. If so, he can step into the creditor's shoes and avoid the same transfer under five hundred forty four B. But if not, he has no one's shoes to step into and he can't use five forty four B to circumvent the code's two year look back period. Here, any creditors' attempt to avoid these federal taxes under state law would obviously be barred by sovereign immunity and other obstacles. The trustees' parallel five hundred forty four B action should therefore fail on the merits.
Respondents' main argument is that Section 106A alters that analysis. But 106A waives immunity at the federal level for 59 bankruptcy code provisions. 106A plainly does not waive immunity for state law claim outside bankruptcy. And 106A likewise does makes clear that it does not alter the substance of the identified code provisions. Rather, it waives immunity so that those provisions can be applied to sovereigns according to their terms. And here, five hundred forty four B by its terms allows a trustee to avoid a transfer, if and only if a creditor could avoid that transfer outside bankruptcy. Nothing in one hundred six A alters that requirement. The trustee's contrary theory misreads one hundred six A and it misses the basic design of five hundred forty four B.
I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh could um uh one oh six be written in a in a way uh that you can get around the immunity problem at merits level at under five forty four?
I think it could be, and I think the way you would do it would be to say something like: in actions under the identified sections, governmental units should be treated like private parties in like circumstances. There actually is an analogous bar uh provision like that in the code under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Congress did write something like that to make sure that the United States could be liable under state tort law, under the terms set forth in that act. But I think that sort of bakes in this idea that Congress would have. Have wanted that result, that Congress would have wanted the United States to be liable under a provision like 544B on the merits. And that goes to the fundamental premise of 544B, which is that 544B exists in the code in order to mirror liability that exists outside of bankruptcy.
And I don't think there's any reason to think that Congress would have wanted to expose the IRS to liability under state law through a provision that only does what already exists. exist outside of bankruptcy.
Council, um what federal causes of action besides maybe the FDCPA might a trustee be able to assert via five forty five four five forty four B?
Um that's probably the best example of what the trustee could assert vis-a-vis five forty four B, but usually five forty four B isn't used against the federal government, which I think is where I I take that's where you're going with this. But we don't think that's a problem with our interpretation because 106A waives immunity as to 59 sections by section, not by subsection, and the waiver has an important role to play as to 544A vis-a-vis the United States.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core dispute over Section 106A’s waiver of sovereign immunity in United States v. Miller?
0:00–7:02
2
How does Section 544B require an “actual creditor” and why does that matter for the trustee’s claim?
7:02–13:37
3
Why does the government argue that a second waiver of immunity is needed for the trustee to use Section 544B against the United States?
13:37–19:44
4
What is the relationship between Sections 544A and 544B and how does 106A affect each provision?
19:44–26:09
5
How do the parties interpret the “voidable” language in Section 544B versus “void” transfers?
26:09–33:18
6
What role do historic cases (e.g., Moore v. Bay) play in shaping the interpretation of Section 544B?
33:18–39:14
7
Why does the trustee argue that the two‑year look‑back period of §548 should not bar recovery in this case?
39:14–46:11
8
What relief does the petitioner seek from the Supreme Court and how might the Court’s decision impact future bankruptcy‑fraudulent‑transfer actions?
46:11–53:36