United States v. Palomar-Santiago (20-437)

argument 20-437

United States v. Palomar-Santiago

Supreme Court of the United States 50 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question in United States v. Palomar‑Santiago?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument next in Case 2437, United States v. Palomar Santiago. Ms. Ross?

Unknown 0:09

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Detective Section 1326B resolves the question presented in this case. In a provision entitled, Limitation on Collateral Attack on Underlying Deportation Order, Congress stated that a non-citizen may not challenge the validity of his removal order unless he demonstrates that he exhausted any available administrative remedies, that the removal proceedings improperly deprived him of the right to judicial review, and that the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Those three express mandatory and conjunctive requirements reflect Congress's sensible determination that non-citizens should challenge their removal orders in their removal proceedings.

Unknown 0:50

using the well-established statutory and regulatory procedures that exist for that very purpose. Congress reasonably prohibited noncitizens from taking the law into their own hands by simply reentering the country and then challenging a prior removal order only if indicted for unlawful reentry. At the same time, consistent with this court's decision in Mendoza-Lopez, Section 13-2060 provides a narrow escape hatch for the rare case in which no prior opportunity for review is available, resulting in fundamental unfairness. Respondent's case does not fall within that narrow class, and his arguments would create a significant loophole in the statute. Respondent plainly could have brought to the BIA, the Court of Appeals, and if necessary, this court, the argument that his prior offense was not an aggravated felony.

Unknown 1:36

just as others later did. And even after this court's decision in Leocal, Respondent could have sought to reopen his removal order or to obtain the Attorney General's permission to reapply for admission. What Respondent could not do was simply reenter the country and then claim immunity from prosecution under Section 1326. This court should enforce the statute as Congress wrote it and reverse. I welcome the court's questions.

John G. Roberts 2:01

Counsel, I want to make sure I understand the government's position correctly. Are there any removal orders that are subject to collateral attack if the alien cannot establish the three requirements of subsection D?

Unknown 2:16

Mr. Chief Justice, I don't think so. I mean, we haven't had to take a position on that in this case because I think the parties, for the most part, agree that 132060 governs. Of course, Respondent has an argument about the idea that he's not challenging the validity at all. We think that's incorrect. But I think Congress meant to limit the collateral attack as it plainly expressed in 132060.

John G. Roberts 2:41

So in a case in which an alien waives or forfeits the right to appeal, there's no way for him to be able to show that administrative remedies were not available. Is that right?

Unknown 2:58

Well, Your Honor, I mean, I think he could. It would be a reading of that term available. So I think, you know, we would follow this court's decision in Ross, which I think is largely common ground here, that there are situations in which remedies would be unavailable. And I think the fact that an individual said he was waiving them wouldn't necessarily be dispositive of that consideration. But, you know, he would have to show that they were, in fact, unavailable under the meaning of availability as this court interpreted it in Ross and as we think is the common meaning of of capable abuse for a purpose here to obtain relief from the order.

John G. Roberts 3:33

What do you understand your friend on the other side to mean by a removal order being employed ab initio?

Unknown 3:41

So, Your Honor, I think what my friend on the other side means by that is that one of two things, essentially, either it was entered without jurisdiction or it was a legal nullity at the moment that it was entered, and I think both of those are incorrect. As a A textual matter and as a matter of the immigration statute, the immigration judge plainly had jurisdiction here. That is to enter a removal order is precisely what immigration judges do.