United States v. Rahimi (22-915)
argument 22-915United States v. Rahimi
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 32m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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Transcript
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What constitutional issue does the Court address regarding guns and domestic violence?
We'll hear argument this morning in Case 22-915, United States v. Rahimi. General Proliger.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, guns and domestic abuse are a deadly combination. As this Court has said, all too often the only difference between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun. Armed abusers also pose grave danger to police officers responding to domestic violence calls and to the public at large, as Zaki Rahimi's own conduct shows. To address that acute threat, Congress and 48 states and territories temporarily disarm individuals subject to domestic violence protective orders. Congress designed Section 922G8 to target the most dangerous domestic abusers. It applies only if, after notice in a hearing, a court makes an express finding that the person poses a credible threat to an intimate partner's physical safety or imposes a specific prohibition on the use of physical force.
And the disarmament lasts only as long as the order remains in effect. The Fifth Circuit profoundly erred in reading this Court's decision in Bruin to prohibit that widespread, common-sense response to the deadly threat of armed domestic violence. Like Heller and McDonald, Bruin recognized that Congress may disarm those who are not law-abiding, responsible citizens. That principle is firmly grounded in the Second Amendment's history and tradition. Throughout our nation's history, legislatures have disarmed those who have committed serious criminal conduct or whose access to guns poses a danger. For example, loyalists, rebels, minors, individuals with mental illness, felons, and drug addicts. Rahimi offers no historical evidence that those laws were thought to violate the right to keep and bear arms, or that the Second Amendment was originally understood to prevent legislatures from disarming dangerous individuals.
Despite all that, the Fifth Circuit held that Section 922G8 is facially unconstitutional because the founding generation didn't disarm domestic abusers in particular. But Bruin specifically approved that kind of demand for a historical twin. The Fifth Circuit's approach departs from the Second Amendment's original meaning and would enact the very sort of regulatory straitjacket that this Court disclaimed in Bruin. I welcome the Court's questions.
General, would you just briefly define what you mean by law-abiding and responsible?
Of course, Justice Thomas. So I would break that into its two constituent components. With respect to those who are not law-abiding, history and tradition shows that that's defined by those who have committed serious crimes, defined by the felony-level punishment that can attach to those crimes. This case focuses on the not responsible citizens principle, and in this context, we think that history and tradition show that it applies to those whose possession of firearms would pose an unusual danger beyond the ordinary citizen with respect to harm to themselves or harm to others.
What if someone – this is a civil action. I think we could agree on the – if these were criminal proceedings – what if someone is categorized as irresponsible for not storing firearms properly?
So I think that there would be a history and tradition to support the idea that if someone has improperly stored their firearms and thus demonstrated by their conduct that they're not fit to keep and bear arms, they would fit within this category of those who are not responsible. And there were a number of historical laws that operated that way. For example, those who had improperly stored gunpowder and caused the risk of explosions.
Below, you had a list of classes of individuals who were excluded in your opening argument. Below, you included in that class or in those classes slaves and Native Americans. Why did you drop those classes?
We haven't invoked those laws at this stage of the proceedings because we think that they speak to a distinct principle and the textual hook that at the particular point in time, those categories of people were viewed as being not among the people protected by the Second Amendment in the first instance.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional issue does the Court address regarding guns and domestic violence?
0:00–12:34
2
How does the government define “law‑abiding” and “responsible” citizens in the context of firearm restrictions?
12:34–26:14
3
Why is “dangerousness” the key standard for disarming individuals under Section 922(g)(8)?
26:14–38:28
4
What due‑process concerns arise from protective‑order hearings and firearm prohibitions?
38:28–50:01
5
How does the Court distinguish a facial challenge from an as‑applied challenge to the statute?
50:01–1:01:07
6
What methodological errors does the government claim lower courts make when applying Bruen?
1:01:07–1:11:01
7
How does legislative consensus and historical tradition support Section 922(g)(8)?
1:11:01–1:22:22
8
What relief does the government seek from the Supreme Court on this case?
1:22:22–1:32:40