United States v. Texas (22-58)

argument 22-58

United States v. Texas

Supreme Court of the United States 2h 16m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central dispute over state standing in United States v. Texas?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument this morning in Case 2258, United States v. Texas. General Preligar?

Elizabeth Prelogar 0:06

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, there are more than 11 million removable noncitizens in this country, and DHS has about 6,000 interior enforcement officers. To focus the agency's limited resources on threats to public safety, national security, and border security, DHS adopted enforcement priorities. but the district court issued a sweeping ruling vacating the guidelines nationwide. This court should reverse. First, the states lack standing. They argue states can challenge any federal policy that imposes even $1 of indirect harms on their own taxing or spending. That theory has no limiting principle. It's incompatible with our constitutional structure, and it contradicts more than 200 years of history and tradition where states could not sue the United States on this basis.

Elizabeth Prelogar 0:59

Federal courts should not now be transformed into open forums for each and every policy dispute between the states and the national government. On the merits, the INA does not create an unyielding mandate to apprehend and remove every non-citizen described in provisions that use the term shall. This Court has repeatedly held that the word shall does not displace background principles of enforcement discretion. Across 25 years, and five presidential administrations, the agency has never implemented the INA in the manner that respondents suggest. Given congressional funding choices, it would be impossible for DHS to do so. Adopting respondents' reading would not lead to more immigration enforcement. Instead, it would just deprive the Secretary of his statutory authority

Elizabeth Prelogar 1:47

to set priorities to protect the nation's security and borders. Finally, as to remedies, the APA did not create a novel remedy of universal vacator, and the INA specifically bars that remedy. Section 1252F1 prohibits the lower courts from granting coercive relief against the operation of the covered INA provisions, and vacator is plainly coercive. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:13

General... Does that same provision, 1252F, also affect redressability for standing purposes?

Elizabeth Prelogar 2:24

Well, you know, I think that we've obviously analyzed these issues in two separate ways, and I think that here, assuming that they were standing, it would have been possible to get a different remedy, like a declaratory judgment, which the State sought in their complaint.

Clarence Thomas 2:37

You don't think that 1252F precludes a declaratory judgment?

Elizabeth Prelogar 2:42

That's right. We do not think that so long as the declaratory judgment is not issued in such a way that the court has made clear that it's coercive and, for example, would be backed up by contempt, that would effectively function like an injunction. We're not disputing that litigants would be able to obtain a declaratory judgment in line with Section 1252F1. So

Clarence Thomas 3:01

which remedies would it preclude in this case?

Elizabeth Prelogar 3:04

So it would preclude the nationwide vacatur that the states obtained here. And the reason for that is because the statute clearly focuses on forms of coercive relief. As the Court said in Alamon-Gonzalez last term, it prevents orders that would require DHS officials to take or refrain from taking action to implement the covered INA provisions while a suit proceeds. And that's because Congress's judgment in this area was that only this Court would should have authority to enter that kind of broad programmatic interference with the operation of the statute while a suit is proceeding. So we think that here, vacator shares the same feature as an injunction in terms of preventing DHS from being able to implement these covered INA provisions while the litigation runs its course.

John G. Roberts 3:49

Your Linda Aras argument, understanding, Doesn't that mean that no state would ever have standing to challenge immigration policies concerning apprehension or removal of aliens?

Elizabeth Prelogar 4:03

That's right. We think that the court articulated a principle there that an individual or a state doesn't have a judicially cognizable injury in seeking enforcement of the law against a third party.