United States v. Tinklenberg (09-1498)
argument 09-1498United States v. Tinklenberg
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion for pre‑trial motions and why is it contested?
We'll hear argument next in case 09-1498, United States v. Tinklenburg. Mr. Roberts.
Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, to accommodate important pretrial proceedings, the Speedy Trial Act contains several automatic exclusions from its deadline for commencing trial. This case concerns the exclusion for pretrial motions, which excludes the period of delay resulting from any pretrial motion from the filing of the motion resulting through the conclusion of the hearing on or other prompt disposition of such motion. For more than 30 years, the courts of appeals had uniformly held that the exclusion applies automatically upon the filing of any motion, regardless of its effect on the trial schedule. The court below correctly rejected that established rule, which accords with this court's decisions, is clear and easy to administer, and has worked well for over three decades.
Court's cases construing the exclusion, Henderson and Bloat, support the established rule. They make clear that the exclusion applies automatically once a motion is filed without any need for district court findings. Henderson and Bloat cannot be squared with the approach of respondent and the court below.
Well, all that might be true. On the other hand, the statute does say delay resultings. And under your approach, the time would be excluded even if delay does not result?
MR. No, Your Honor. Delay refers to the interval of time from the filing of the motion through its disposition during which the speedy trial act deadline is told. We know that delay has the meaning — delay can often have the meaning of the interval of time between two events, and we know it has that meaning In the statute here, because subsection D tells us so, it defines the period of excludable delay resulting from the motion as the time from the filing through the disposition of the motion. Respondent's
definition — But the Chief Justice says only if — it's really a circular argument — only if it results in a delay. But suppose it doesn't result in a delay.
That's assuming that delay is referring to delay of the trial. to a postponement in the trial. But delay can't have that meaning because if it has that, if that meaning is inconsistent with subsection D of the statute's exclusion of the time of saying that delay is the time from the filing of the motion through the disposition of the motion, because the statute excludes periods of delay, and if delay meant postponement of the trial, then the excluded period would be the time during which trial is postponed, but that period is often significantly shorter or longer than the time from the filing of the motion to the disposition. And in Henderson v. Bloat — JUSTICE
BREYER. But doesn't that prove the point that I think was the concern of the Chief Justice's question, that in some cases there's a delay that results and in other cases there isn't?
MR. But, Your Honor, the statute excludes the period of delay and then it says the period of delay is the time from the filing through the disposition. If delay means postponement of the trial, then all that's excluded by the statute in the first part is the time during which trial is postponed. But that doesn't match up with subsection D because that period is not necessarily the period from the filing through the disposition. If I could give you an example, say a motion is filed 14 days before trial could begin. And the motion takes 16 days to resolve. Trial is postponed only by two days. And so if delay means the postponement of trial, then the period of delay should be two days. But the statute says that the delay and the excludable time is the time from the filing through the disposition, which is 16 days, and that's what this Court held in Henderson
and bloat, that that's the exact time. So if you adopt a definition of delay for the first part as a triggering mechanism that's the postponement of trial, that doesn't line up with the rest of the statute. In addition, that would be a totally unworkable rule because whether time is excludable would turn on a complex and often uncertain analysis.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Speedy Trial Act’s exclusion for pre‑trial motions and why is it contested?
0:00–9:19
2
How do the parties define “delay resulting from” a motion and what examples do they use?
9:19–17:27
3
Why do the Justices consider the rule unworkable if it depends on a judge’s trial‑date setting?
17:27–22:06
4
What is the impact of the 2009 amendment to Rule 45 on counting calendar versus business days?
22:06–30:01
5
How does the government argue that administrative motions should not toll the speedy‑trial clock?
30:01–36:58
6
What concerns do the Justices raise about applying a “delay” test that varies by case facts?
36:58–43:36
7
Why might the Court choose to affirm the lower‑court decision rather than dismiss the case as improvidently granted?
43:36–50:46
8
What final conclusions do the Justices reach about the proper interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act?
50:46–58:51