United States v. Wurie (13-212)
argument 13-212United States v. Wurie
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What are the facts of United States v. Wurie and why are they relevant to cell‑phone searches?
We'll hear argument next in case thirteen two twelve, United States versus Worry. Welcome back.
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice. And may it please the court. The facts of this case, United States versus Worry, I think illustrate why any categorical rule that would preclude searches of cell phones incident to arrest would be inconsistent with historical practice and detrimental to law enforcement. This is a case where what the officers did was see a phone ringing. On the outside screen, the caller was identified as my house. the officers opened up the phone, pressed one button uh to see that the call came in from my house and pressed another to see what the phone number was. That's all they did. That kind of a search serves valid time honored functions in the search situation of helping to ascertain the identity of the offender.
This was a crucial fact because a few minutes later uh Worry lied about where he lived, which was relevant to the police ultimately obtaining a warrant to search his house. If they didn't know where he was, they would not be able to
I'm not su I'm not sure if he was at the precinct. They could have gotten a warrant. And Um Once he lied about his arrest they would have known he wasn't living there and would have gotten a warrant.
Justice Sotomayor, you could almost always say in search incident to arrest cases that the police could have gotten a warrant. It's I'm not talking about cases where somebody uh is carrying a gun and the police take the gun off them and they secure it that way. But in all of the other cases that you could imagine that involve searches for evidence, letters which occur in the historical cases, uh bill folds which have been discussed here. Once the officer has it, you could say the officer shouldn't be able to look in it because that could be done under a warrant. There's no time constraint, there's no destruction of evidence constraint. Here in fact there actually is a destruction of evidence threat.
With respect to the general category of cell phones, and that's what this court has been asked to look at, the general category of cell phones and smartphones. We discussed earlier the threat of remote wiping and whether airplane mode is an effective counter to that. There is the other threat that I think is even more critical to law enforcement today, and that is encryption. Because if the phone turns off and becomes encrypted, officers can go to uh the magic And ask for a warrant, but it may be months or years or never if they can break through the encryption and actually obtain the evidence. So to the extent that the traditional destruction of evidence rationale justified the search of a cell phone, or justified the search of traditional items, it applies even more strongly with respect to cell phones than it does with
most of the items that might be seized from a person. So
the worry I think please tell me about encryption because I know people can encrypt, but I thought they had to do that when they put the information in the phone.
No, as as best I understand it, just as so do my or Many smartphones today are equipped with built-in encryption. Apple has hardware encryption and software encryption. Samsung and HTC and other brands are quickly following with strong encryption. The encryption is deployed in a way that if you don't have the key, the data that's on the phone is useless. The key is often stored in memory. and it's accessible only when you can get into the phone. Now if the phone is on and functioning because the person has been arrested while they, for example, are making a phone call, you can get access to the phone and you can attempt to get information from the phone without the encryption key being an obstacle. But if the encryption is deployed
That can sometimes be a insuperable barrier, even to the other thing. I'm not sure if
on the scene the police are going to look at everything in a cell phone anyway. They gotta be doing something to save it. If the encryption can be
Well no the the the evidence is incr th the information on the phone is encrypted.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What are the facts of United States v. Wurie and why are they relevant to cell‑phone searches?
0:01–9:37
2
How does the government argue that a brief glance at a ringing phone helps identify the suspect?
9:37–19:14
3
What role does modern smartphone encryption play in the search‑incident‑to‑arrest analysis?
19:14–27:50
4
Do individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in call logs and other phone data?
27:50–33:39
5
When, if ever, can police rely on exigent circumstances instead of a warrant to search a phone?
33:39–40:25
6
What limiting principles (scope, duration, relevance) could constrain phone searches under the Fourth Amendment?
40:25–47:35
7
How should courts balance law‑enforcement interests against privacy interests in the digital age?
47:35–54:18
8
Why does the Court ultimately reject a categorical rule barring all phone searches incident to arrest?
54:18–57:37