University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (12-484)
argument 12-484University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What does the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. Nassar require for proving retaliation?
Our last case of the year is twelve four eighty four University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center versus NASA. Mr. Josefer?
Good morning, and may it please the court. This court's decision in gross does most of the work in this case. and the plain language of the nineteen ninety one amendments to Title VII do the rest. Under Gross, NASA must prove that retaliation was the butt for cause of the challenged employment action. unless Congress has specifically relieved him of that burden by authorising a mixed vote of claim. In in the nineteen ninety one amendments, however, Congress authorized mixed mode of treatment only for Title VII claims that chall that challenge discrimination based on membership in a protected class, not for retaliation claims. And for that reason, a Title seven retaliation plaintiff must approve but for causation.
In the in the uh age discrimination context, there wouldn't be a difference between the a discrimination claim itself. And the uh retaliation. They'd both be governed by the same standard. Isn't that right, in the age discrimination area, the butt fork. causation. Or am I wrong about that? Yeah, the well the the Age Act does not permit any mixed motive tri claim. Yes. So for this purpose in the Age Act everything is but four, that's correct. Where it's very clear. what the standard Congress wants to have. for the discrimination claim. you're gonna have a different standard for retaliation. So in these statute I thought these two travel together, whatever the standard is for discrimination, it's the same for retaliation.
Well that I mean to some extent within Title seven that is the question in the case. But what we have here is an amendment. Within Title seven, this provision of Title seven remember set forth discrimination based on on class and discrimination based on retaliation as separate types of discrimination and this provision treats them differently. It's just a good idea.
that there's a different standard for proven retaliation than there is for proven substantive discrimination. Because as I sort of survey the universe, it seems as though whatever the standard is, the standard is the same for both. And there's no s statute in which the two have been divorced. Am I wrong about that?
Well that I mean I The reason I guess is the question is I I I would agree in the sense that if what we're talking about is but for versus mixed motive, right? It's it's but for everywhere except for within the meaning of this one amendment. Congress clearly intended to make an exception. here to the normal but force.
of causation for a retaliation claim than we do for a substantive discrimination claim.
No, because it is but for everywhere, except for this one amendment.
Well, is there I mean, uh it's but for everywhere, is there even any time at which whatever the standard that applied you know, pre gross. Is there ever a moment And is there ever a statute? in the history of anti discrimination laws. where there has been a divorce uh a a a different standard for retaliation than for substantive discrimination.
No uh I I I can't point to anything specific because what we had, right, was there is this I can't point to anything specific on that up up until the statute, the whole point of gross, right, is that the statute carves out a narrow exception from but four and figure out.
uh the the ADEA and and outside Title seven. Miss you know, we've had a lot of discrimination statutes since nineteen sixty four. We've had a lot of different standards applying to those discrimination statutes since nineteen sixty four. and you're coming in here and asking for the first time in all those many decades that we should divorce the retaliation claim from the substantive discrimination claim and make them follow two different standards. Is that correct?
I I mean yes and no in the sense that if we're talking about butt for versus mixed, right, yes, that's a creature of this specific statute we're talking about. If we're talking about other aspects of retaliation and other types of discrimination, there are differences in the statutes.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What does the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. Nassar require for proving retaliation?
0:02–8:10
2
How does the 1991 amendment to Title VII affect the “but‑for” causation standard for retaliation claims?
8:10–14:57
3
Why do the parties argue that the EEOC’s mixed‑motive guidance conflicts with the plain text of the statute?
14:57–23:37
4
What is the significance of the separate retaliation provision in § 2000 e‑3 A for interpreting the statute?
23:37–30:16
5
How do Jackson, Gomez Perez, and other precedent cases shape the court’s view of retaliation versus discrimination?
30:16–37:07
6
What policy concerns arise from allowing a different causation standard for retaliation claims?
37:07–45:18
7
Why did Congress choose to keep distinct language for retaliation when amending Title VII in 1991?
45:18–53:47
8
What are the parties’ final arguments about whether Congress created two causation standards within the same statute?
53:47–1:01:52