Utah v. Strieff (14-1373)
argument 14-1373Utah v. Strieff
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s central question about the exclusionary rule in Utah v. Strieff?
We'll hear argument next in case 141373, Utah v. Strife. Mr. Green.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Courts typically apply the exclusionary rule to suppress unlawfully seized evidence. The question here is whether to suppress evidence lawfully seized in a search incident to a warrant arrest because the arresting officer found the warrant in a stop later judged to be unlawful. Under this Court's attenuation analysis, such evidence is admissible when, as here, the predicate stop was not flagrant but resulted from an objectively reasonable miscalculation. Extending the exclusionary rule.
Tell me what was objectively reasonable about it. Well, Your Honor. The police officer admits that the person he saw coming out of the house in question wasn't doing anything. He didn't know that he lived there. He didn't know what he had done, if anything. He didn't even really know that there was drug dealing going on in the house. He was trying to figure that out. So what was objectively reasonable about stopping this man?
Justice Sotomayor, we've admitted that this was a miscalculation, but it was a close call. If the officer here had stopped the first person coming out of the house after receiving the tip, that would have been objectively unreasonable under this court's case and decision in Alabama v. White. But this person wasn't the first person he saw come out of the house. He'd received the anonymous tip and then had proceeded to corroborate it through three hours of surveillance and observation over the course of the ensuing week. And all the traffic he saw during those three hours was the same short stay traffic that was reported in the tip. Based on his training and experience, that activity was consistent.
It would
be interesting if he waited to see whether this was also a short stay visitor. I think he would have. I don't see how this is any different than stopping the first person you see.
Well, I think, Your Honor, as we've admitted, I think if he had seen it and it were short stay, I think we may well be to reasonable suspicion. And I think that's why the prosecutor here conceded that it wasn't. But it was a close call based on everything he had seen to that point. And in these circumstances, we think that's where the predicate conduct was a result of misconduct that was not — What's
going to stop police officers if we announce your rule, and your rule seems to be, once we have your name, if there's a warrant out on you, that's an attenuating circumstance under every circumstance — What stops us from becoming a police state and just having the police stand on the corner down here and stop every person, ask them for identification, put it through, and if a warrant comes up, searching them?
I think, Justice Sotomayor, I think there are two answers to that question. First, I think our rule, an officer can never count under our rule on finding a warrant. So there is no incentive for him to make that stop. If there's no warrant and the stop
is awful. Well, if you have a town like Ferguson, where 80 percent of the residents have minor traffic warrants out, there may be a very good incentive for just standing on the street corner in Ferguson and asking every citizen, give me your ID, let me see your name, and let me hope, because I have an 80 percent chance, that you're going to have a warrant.
Well, I understand, Your Honor, and that's the second part of my answer, is that officers can't count. Under our rule, a warrant by itself is not sufficient. There still must be a separate inquiry into whether the predicate stop was flagrant, and an officer can't count in any particular stop on a judge later concluding that the stop was
not flagrant. But I assume, Mr. Green, that there are a variety of circumstances in which police officers would really like to talk to somebody and really like to search them. but don't have reasonable suspicion. And I think that the question that Justice Sotomayor is asking is, if you're policing a community where there's some significant percentage of people who have arrest warrants out on them, it really does increase your incentive to make that stop on the chance that there will be a warrant that will allow you to search and admit whatever evidence
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s central question about the exclusionary rule in Utah v. Strieff?
0:01–8:35
2
How do the Justices evaluate whether the officer’s stop was objectively reasonable?
8:35–16:10
3
Why do the parties argue that a warrant check creates a deterrent incentive for police?
16:10–24:07
4
What is the Court’s analysis of “flagrant” conduct and its safety‑valve role?
24:07–31:27
5
How is an intervening circumstance defined and applied to the attenuation test?
31:27–38:23
6
What are the legal standards for a Terry stop and reasonable suspicion in this case?
38:23–44:42
7
How do statistics on outstanding warrants affect the argument about police incentives?
44:42–52:32
8
What conclusion does the Court reach regarding Utah’s rule and future suppression?
52:32–59:33