Vance v. Ball State Univ. (11-556)
argument 11-556Vance v. Ball State Univ.
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s central question about who counts as a supervisor under Title VII?
Our argument next this morning in case 11556, Vance v. Ball State University. Mr. Ortiz.
Mr. Chief Justice, it may please the Court. This case concerns who counts and who does not count as a supervisor under Title VII. The parties in the United States agree that the Seventh Circuit rule violates the holding of Farragher, the reasoning of Farragher in this Court's other central Title VII precedents, including Burlington, Northern, and Stout, and the common sense meaning of the word supervisor. The parties even agree as to the general legal standard, although they style it a little bit differently, that those harassers whose employer-conferred authority over their victims enables and materially augments the harassment should count as supervisors. This is not a standard, Your Honor, that imposes automatic liability on employers.
Victims must still prove actionable harassment, and employers can still take advantage of the Eller-Faragher affirmative defense.
Let's say you have a workroom or five people who work there, and the employer has a rule that the senior employee gets to pick the music that's going to play all day long. And the senior employee says to one of the other employees, you know, if you don't date me, I know you don't like country music. If you don't date me, it's going to be country music all day long. Now, that affects the daily activities of that other employee. I would have thought under your theory that means that that senior employee is a supervisor.
No, Your Honor, because in that circumstance, the adverse action would not amount to — would not be severe, or perhaps it would
be — That could be far more severe than, for example — Hard rock instead
of — It
could be far more severe than simply saying, all right, you know, you're going to — as in this case, you're going to be cutting the celery rather than, you know, baking the bread or whatever.
Well, no, Your Honor, this is the severity is an objective standard. It's not subjective. So in this case, someone's intense dislike, maybe it's debilitating, subjective dislike of rock music, some forms of country music, might impair the performance of some in the workplace. But from an objective, reasonable employee's standpoint, I don't believe that that would be a case. Not all of them.
No, but I mean there are places where the environment, you know, an assembly line or something like that, where the task may not be that different, but how the environment in which you have to perform them may be far more significant than whether or not you're attaching the door handles or the front fenders.
Oh, for sure, Your Honor. But it has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Well, exactly. And I would have thought the benefit of the Seventh Circuit's test was that you don't have to go through those case-by-case bases. I think we can have a reasonable debate about whether the music you have to listen to for eight hours is objectively a significant enough interference with the daily activities to qualify under your test. But the Seventh Circuit test makes clear — it doesn't give any kind of immunity. It just makes clear what type of analysis is going to be applied to the allegation.
Well, Your Honor, the respondent actually exaggerates the determinativeness of the Seventh Circuit rule and the indeterminateness, supposed indeterminateness and unpredictability of the Second Circuit rule. The Seventh Circuit itself has recognized — judges on the Seventh Circuit itself has recognized that the rule does not really well fit the realities of the workplace. It also just moves uncertainty from one category to another. The category of supervisor may be a little bit tidier, but under the Seventh Circuit's approach, the category of coworker is very unpredictable. The Seventh Circuit itself in Doe v. Overvised Dairies recognized that once you move people who can take, have this kind of power over their victims but can't actually take
tangible employment actions against them into the category of coworkers, all of a sudden you have to apply a sliding scale of negligence.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s central question about who counts as a supervisor under Title VII?
0:04–10:03
2
How do the parties use the music‑selection hypothetical to illustrate supervisory authority?
10:03–16:53
3
What is the material‑adversity standard and how does it affect liability for harassment?
16:53–24:40
4
Why do the parties argue that the Seventh Circuit test is less predictable than the Second Circuit rule?
24:40–30:23
5
How does the EEOC’s guidance differ from the circuit tests in defining a supervisor?
30:23–37:35
6
What evidence is presented to show whether Davis had authority over daily work assignments?
37:35–44:44
7
Why do the advocates contend that summary judgment should be affirmed rather than remanded?
44:44–52:53
8
What final guidance does the Court consider appropriate for future Title VII supervisor determinations?
52:53–59:41