Vartelas v. Holder (10-1211)
argument 10-1211Vartelas v. Holder
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the core legal issue the Court is addressing in Vartelas v. Holder?
We'll hear argument next in case ten, twelve, eleven, Vartales versus Holder. Mr. Beavis?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. As the government concedes, INA subsection 101 A thirteen C five, added by IRIRA, does not expressly mandate retroactivity. Under land graph, applying that new provision would attach new legal consequences to pre-IRIRA offenses, penalizing both those who travel and those who don't. Covered lawful permanent residents could not visit their parents abroad without being forced to abandon their children here. They would be removed from the country or else confined here. Either way, they would lose an ability they had under pre IRIRA law based on pre IRIRA offenses, thus applying the subsection to them would be impermissibly retroactive. The settled expectations at issue here are those of round trips by lawful permanent residents, not, as the government would put it, one-way tickets or first-time entrants.
These are people who have structured their lives here. They have homes, spouses, children and careers here, and yet have a settled expectation that they will be able to maintain ties to visit aged and ailing parents abroad, to go to funerals and wakes and visit them at the hospital and surgeries. Our Amiki, the Nactal Brief, and the aged As far
as going forward is concerned, that's that's just the way it is, right?
Yes, because Congress has expressly changed the law post-IRIRA. The question is for those before IRIRA whether those subtle expectations are being disrupted.
Could they could they the the person who who who is here and then the New law is passed. Could that person have petitioned for discretionary relief before travelling?
Yes, Your Honor, that is a possibility. That is not the same as the automatic ability to travel, and in fact in this case the discretionary relief was denied. It depends on a different set of factors from the automatic prior ability to travel. Um but it is a theoretical possibility in some cases.
So your expectations argument is that somebody trying to figure out whether to go ahead and and rob the bank is going to say, well I do and I'm caught and I'm found guilty, I won't be able to take temporary trips abroad, so I'm not going to rob the bank.
Uh no, Your Honor. First of all, you phrased it specifically as a a reliance argument, which is an alternative, even the government concedes it's not a prerequisite. Second, the right time to look at expectations is the moment before the law is enacted. Does one have an expectation at that point that one
will be able to continue? Well you're concerned under Landgraf, I think, with whether or not it disrupts settled expectations. And it just doesn't seem to me that this issue enters into the uh expectations at all when the pertinent act, which is the commission of the crime, not the pleading guilty, uh takes place.
Uh No, Your Honor, I believe the practical impact is a new travel disability or penalty. Just as in Landgraf, the discrimination there had been illegal for decades, yet adding a new form of damages to it was impermissibly retroactive. In Hughes Aircraft, filing false claims with the government had been illegal for years, yet broadening the class of people who could file suit and removing a defense No reliance possible at all, but there was a settled expectation that there would be no additional consequences attached to
the other.
Person who commits the crime just after the act is passed had the expectation prior to the passage of the act that if he did certain things he wouldn't that he wouldn't have this consequence from his conduct.
Congress, of course, has the power to change things, but the expectation until an act is passed is that the consequences are fixed in time. And if Congress decides that the potential unfairness is outweighed by the benefits of
But the the person who d who ha who commits the crime just after the act is passed had the expectation prior to that time that had if he did certain things in the future he wouldn't suffer certain consequences.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core legal issue the Court is addressing in Vartelas v. Holder?
0:01–8:50
2
How does the Government argue that INA §101 A13 C5 is not retroactive?
8:50–16:30
3
Why do petitioners claim they have settled expectations for round‑trip travel?
16:30–24:10
4
What role does reliance on pre‑IRIRA law play in the retroactivity analysis?
24:10–31:58
5
How does the Landgraf test influence the Court’s view of the statute’s effect?
31:58–39:08
6
What is the practical impact of the statute on lawful permanent residents’ ability to travel?
39:08–48:18
7
How do the parties interpret the statutory language regarding admission versus entry?
48:18–56:03
8
What conclusion does the Court reach about the retroactive application of the IRIRA provision?
56:03–57:30