Vega v. Tekoh (21-499)

argument 21-499

Vega v. Tekoh

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 20m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the central issue the Court is being asked to decide in Vega v. Tekoh?

John G. Roberts 0:01
We will hear argument this morning in case twenty one four hundred ninety nine. Vega versus Techco. Mr Martinez?
David A. Martinez 0:10
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Ninth Circuit's extension of Miranda into nineteen eighty three litigation is inconsistent with settled precedent and sound policy, for two reasons you should reverse. First, Miranda is a judicially crafted prophylactic rule, and the violation of such a rule doesn't violate the constitutional rights of any person. That's what the Chavez plurality said, reiterating pre Dickerson holdings that Miranda violations result in no constitutional deprivation that's pain and no identifiable constitutional harm that's Elstat. Tycho in the Ninth Circuit say that Dickerson abandoned these cases, but in fact Dickerson reaffirmed their limits on Miranda's scope.
David A. Martinez 0:54
The cases show that Miranda's presumption of coercion applies only when courts assess whether a statement is admissible in the prosecution's case in chief at trial. In that context, when a defendant's liberty is at stake, Miranda creates a protective fence around the Fifth Amendment. It gives gives defendants a windfall benefit by excluding statements that are completely voluntary. A trial court's Miranda violation taking away that windfall is reversible error, but it doesn't violate the defendant's actual Fifth Amendment rights and it doesn't trigger a right to money damages. Second, as TICO now concedes, the Ninth Circuit's proximate causation holding is wrong. That concession provides a complete basis for reversal here.
David A. Martinez 1:39
Officers can't be held liable when the mistakes are made by prosecutors and judges. Tycho tries to rescue his case with a brand new causation theory based on alleged lies, but that theory can't work for him here. It's inconsistent with his jury instruction, it was forfeited below, its factual premise was rejected by the jury, and it's legally baseless in any event. Sergeant Vega's conduct has been exonerated from every angle by four different fact finders. Two judges said Miranda warnings weren't required, a jury said there was no fabrication of evidence, both juries said there was no coercion. This case should end. Unless the court has questions, I'll start with our view of what
Clarence Thomas 2:19
I'm saying. Um In in Dickerson we held the court held that. uh Miranda could not be displaced by a uh federal statute, by Congress. Uh if that's the case then why is it not a constitutional a r uh a right secured by the constitution and hence actionable under nineteen eighty three?
David A. Martinez 2:45
Your Honor, we we read Dickerson as saying that uh that that Miranda has constitutional status, constitutional underpinnings, and we agree with the other side. What
Clarence Thomas 2:53
does that mean?
David A. Martinez 2:54
I think what that means is that it can't be overturned by statute. But I think Dickerson was very clear that it was not uh you know, there was a dispute in Dickerson between the majority opinion and Justice Scalia, where Justice Scalia was saying the majority's theory here is basically that Miranda violates uh that a Miranda violation is a violation of Fifth Amendment rights. And the court very clearly didn't was not willing to say that. I think the dispute between us here on what Dickerson does is whether Dickerson essentially changes the status quo and overturns the line of uh pre-Dickerson cases, the cases that came between Miranda and Dickerson, which repeatedly said that a violation of Miranda doesn't violate anyone's constitutional rights.
David A. Martinez 3:33
And the Chavez plurality, I think, addresses this issue head-on and it says that because Miranda is a judicially created prophylactic rule, the violation of that rule doesn't violate anyone's constitution. one's constitutional rights. That is consistent, as I was saying earlier, with what the Court had previously said in cases like Payne and Elstad.
Clarence Thomas 3:51
Yeah, but I couldn't get a majority in Chavez, so The um uh that I don't know how much that does for you. Um Would you tell me what is the um how could something b be both a rule be both prophylactic and constitutional?
David A. Martinez 4:07
I think it can be prophylactic and constitutional because the whole purpose of the rule is to protect the underlying constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.

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