Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. (23-929)
argument 23-929Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 7m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What is the statutory interpretation of the 60‑day voluntary departure period under § 1229(c)?
You'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty three nine twenty nine Velasquez versus Garland. Mr Cedrone.
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The sixty day time period in the voluntary departure statute works like any routine legal time period. When the last day falls on a weekend or holiday, the period continues to run until the next business day. Congress would have expected people to read the statute this way. In nineteen ninety six, common law principles, case law, established rules and regulations, and years of consistent practice all pointed to that interpretation. If Congress had meant to deviate from that traditional understanding, it would have said so. Even the government now acknowledges that other deadlines in the same section of IRIRA follow the traditional rule in light of a long standing immigration regulation defining the word day.
So the only way to adopt the government's interpretation is to believe that Congress used two different meanings of the word day in the same section of the same statute. There's simply no indication that Congress took that kind of split approach. The government's interpretation would also spell chaos for regulatory definitions and deadlines. In the government's view, even though Section 1001.1H provides a single definition for the word day That r the immigration regulations actually use that term to mean different things throughout. And so the only way to tell which deadline follows which time calculation rule is to trace each deadline's history back through earlier and earlier versions of the Code and Code of Federal Regulations.
Answering a question as simple as does my deadline fall on Saturday or Monday shouldn't depend on this kind of complex historical investigation, especially when deportations on the line. The default rule for weekends and holidays exists precisely to avoid this kind of case by case guesswork. The government identifies no reason, and certainly no reason grounded in the text of the statute, to depart from that traditional rule. The Court should read Section twelve twenty nine C like any other statute and follow the usual rule for weekends and holidays. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh twelve fifty two A speaks in terms of uh a remove final uh removal order. Uh is there one involved in this uh case?
There is, Your Honor, and I would make two points. First, as you point out, subsection A1 speaks in terms of judicial review of a final order of removal. That's exactly what we're seeking. If we win in this case, the final order of removal that binds our client will say one thing. If we lose, it will say another. And the second point is this court has long recognized that BIA decisions on reopening and reconsideration are separate final orders. that require a separate petition and are separately reviewable in the Courts of Appeals.
Uh w it seems that you're saying that a collateral consequence to a ruling on this uh is a part of the final order. Uh how is that?
So the voluntary I I disagree, Your Honor, in in two respects. So one, as I just pointed out, the Court has consistently explained that a reconsideration or reopening decision is
I thought we were talking about the sixty whether there are sixty days or sixty two days to leave for uh voluntarily.
That's right, Your Honor. And the voluntary departure order at pages 42A and 43A of the petition appendix spell out the consequences if, on the one hand, our client files a timely motion to reopen, or on the other hand, if our client uh fails to depart the country or files an untimely motion, there are two alternate orders of removal waiting in the wings, one with harsh penalties, one without, and this timely motion cleanness determination directly affects which of those alternate orders of removal will take effect.
You um uh argue uh and just did that this is a very simple question. Uh but a good part of your argument is taking regulatory provisions and applying them to The statute. You say that that is the appropriate prism through which to read the statute.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory interpretation of the 60‑day voluntary departure period under § 1229(c)?
0:00–8:49
2
How does the government’s “day” definition in § 1001.1 affect deadline calculations for immigration deadlines?
8:49–19:30
3
Why does the petitioner argue that the traditional weekend‑and‑holiday rollover rule should apply to the voluntary departure deadline?
19:30–26:31
4
What are the collateral consequences of missing the voluntary departure deadline, and can they be challenged separately?
26:31–34:31
5
How do jurisdictional provisions in § 1252(a)(1) and the “zipper clause” limit review of final orders of removal?
34:31–42:05
6
What role do prior cases like *Street*, *Mata*, and *Nasrallah* play in shaping the Court’s analysis?
42:05–49:46
7
Why does the government claim this case is a “one‑off” and how might that affect the Court’s decision?
49:46–58:39
8
What potential ripple effects could a decision on jurisdiction and deadline interpretation have for future immigration cases?
58:39–1:07:13