Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (20-1573)

argument 20-1573

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 20m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What precedent cases control the outcome of Viking River Cruises v. Moriana?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument this morning in case number twenty fifteen seventy three Viking River

Paul D. Clement 0:05

Cruises versus Moriana. Mr Clement. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the outcome here is controlled by this Court's decisions in Concepcion, EPIC, and Lamps Plus. After those decisions, a State is not free to simply declare that a State statute is too important to be relegated to bilateral arbitration. None of the varying theories offered by respondent or the lower courts supports a different result. Respondence suggests that the waiver here is an invalid effort to immunize Viking rather than a valid effort to preserve bilateral arbitration. But Viking remains liable to Moriana for any labor code violation that she can prove affected her personally, and remains liable to the State for civil and criminal penalties.

Paul D. Clement 0:54

The only thing that is foreclosed is Moriana's effort to inject the Facts and circumstances of countless other workers into this dispute, despite her agreement to arbitrate bilaterally. The Ninth Circuit viewed PAGA claims as more consistent with arbitration than class actions. But employer-wide PAGA claims are very similar to employer-wide FLSA collective actions, and Moriana's own complaint demonstrates the great difference between an effort to inject all manner of labor code violations for the entire sales force, as opposed to Moriana's dispute about her final paycheck. The former requires a claim settlement process borrowed from a class action manual. The latter can be arbitrated in an afternoon.

Paul D. Clement 1:41

California's Supreme Court, for its part, said that PAGA claims are outside the FAA entirely based on a misplaced analogy to Waffle House. But Ascanian's theory that the PAGA claim belongs to the State, and the State didn't agree to arbitrate, would make all PAGA claims, whether individual or employer wide, immune from arbitration, which would make the conflict with the FAA unmistakable. And the Analogy to Waffle House is a non starter. Here the same party that is in court seeking to litigate on behalf of the entire workforce is the selfsame party who agreed to arbitrate bilaterally. I would welcome the court's questions.

John G. Roberts 2:20

Mr. Clement, um if somebody else, uh a a different employee of Viking Cruises, brings a PAGA action that by its terms would include uh Ms. Moriana, uh would she be able to be included among the group of people, the large group of people, uh that would uh uh recover under that action? In other words, she would not be bringing the action herself. It would be brought by somebody else and she would be among the beneficiaries under California law of that action.

Paul D. Clement 2:49

I think, Mr. Chief Justice, that that would still be foreclosed by the class arbitration paga waiver here. The provision and it is reproduced to page thirteen of the Blue Brief, but it has essentially two subsections. The first involves the employee saying that they won't bring a class action, a collective action, or a private attorney general action, and then it continues to say that they won't participate as a member in a class action. A collective action or a PAGA action. So I would think that based on the contract, Moriana has foreclosed her ability to essentially benefit from that kind of employer-wide PAGA action. But if I'm wrong about that, I don't think it changes the outcome in this particular case.

Paul D. Clement 3:30

I think here the important thing is that this action shares the fundamental attributes of a class action and a collective action that may be a very important thing. make them inappropriate for traditional bilateral arbitration. They aggregate multiple claims in a single proceeding with heightened stakes and wide discovery.

John G. Roberts 3:50

Well but this is what strikes me as one one difference is that this is not her cause of action. This is the state's cause of action. Um uh it is uh Uh an action it's the Attorney General's action. She's acting not really as would be acting not simply as herself, but as a Uh deleguee of the Attorney General. and would be securing a recovery for the state as well as for other employees.