Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren (16-1275)
argument 16-1275Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s precedent from the PG&E case and why does it matter here?
We'll hear argument next in Case 16-1275, Virginia Uranium v. Warren. Mr.
Cooper. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, in the PG&E case, this Court held that although the State of California had the undisputed regulatory power to place a moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants, it was preempted under the Atomic Energy Act by from using that undisputed de jure authority as a means for indirectly and de facto regulating the nuclear safety of nuclear plants.
Mr. Cooper, there's something odd with using PG&E for your side, because the bottom line in that case was no preemption.
That's true, Your Honor.
So to say, well, they said all this stuff along the way, but the bottom line judgment, and that was true in English as well, no preemption.
Your Honor, and the reason that the court in PG&E came to that conclusion was it accepted the Court of Appeals interpretation of state law that the purpose, the purpose of that regulatory, that that the courts or the California's exercise of regulatory authority was not for the purpose of protecting against radiation hazards, which is the line drawn in the statute between what is federal and what is state. So PG&E, Your Honor, as I say, clearly held that the A state could not use its acknowledged authority to indirectly and de facto regulate an activity that was in the exclusive authority of the NRC.
What if it's dual purpose?
Well, Your Honor.
Which a lot of things are going to be in this context.
That's true, Your Honor.
So how does that work?
Just Kavanaugh. in a case where it's a dual purpose, this court and PG&E said, is it grounded in the impermissible purpose? Is it grounded in the courts of appeals have had no problem examining situations where, and that's going to be true in
most legislation. Mr. Cooper, then don't we get into trouble under Shady Grove of guessing what the motivations of a state legislature are and all the methodological, epistemological and federalism questions that that raises. What do we do about that?
Your Honor, this Court, in a variety of contexts, is called upon to examine the legislative purpose
of a particular enactment. I know we do it in the 14th Amendment context, for example, but I'm hard-pressed to come up with many other examples where we look at state legislative purpose and decide its permissibility based on our assessment of legislative motive.
Well, Your Honor, and we have not been able to find another statute where Congress has prescribed a purpose-based preemption standard. But Congress has nonetheless, in terms that are quite clear and in terms that this Court in PG&E accepted and implemented made purpose the line between what is state and what is federal with respect to the regulation of nuclear power development.
So we're just stuck with purpose, whether we like it or not. I got it.
That's the bottom line,
yes. But is PG&E perhaps distinguishable on this basis, that at least there, California was directly regulating nuclear the construction of nuclear power plants, prohibiting them. And that is an area under, what is it, 2021C that's expressly preempted. Here you have efforts to regulate mining and upstream activity that are not expressly dealt with in the statute. So what do we do about that?
Your Honor, I don't think that distinguishes PG&E at all because in PG&E, The state was using its acknowledged power to decide whether nuclear power plants would be constructed.
I'm sorry to interrupt, but I just want to narrow the question so that it might be more productive for me, hopefully for me. There, California was regulating construction, and that's dealt with by C. But K, I grant you, 2021 K, does seem to have a carve-out based on purpose. Yes. You got me there, okay? Yes. But I think Justice White was saying, well, within the construction world, all right, we have this carve-out under K that we have to deal with, and California might regulate construction for purposes other than safety considerations, for economic or other considerations. But what do we do about it when a state comes along and says, I'm not even going to regulate construction.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s precedent from the PG&E case and why does it matter here?
0:00–9:31
2
How does the Court distinguish a “dual‑purpose” regulation from an impermissible one?
9:31–17:41
3
What is the purpose‑analysis framework the Court uses to evaluate state statutes?
17:41–25:33
4
Why does Virginia argue its uranium‑mining ban should not be pre‑empted by federal law?
25:33–31:23
5
How do the parties interpret the Atomic Energy Act’s pre‑emption language for mining versus milling?
31:23–38:04
6
What role do legislative history and the “reasonable legislator” test play in this case?
38:04–45:16
7
How do prior decisions like Skull Valley and Entergy influence the pre‑emption analysis?
45:16–52:33
8
What is the Court’s ultimate conclusion on whether Virginia’s ban is pre‑empted?
52:33–59:22