Voisine v. United States (14-10154)
argument 14-10154Voisine v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
52 min
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s three‑prong argument for excluding reckless misdemeanors from the “use of physical force” definition?
Your argument first first this morning in case fourteen one oh one five four Voisine and Armstrong versus United States. Ms. Weer?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. There are three reasons to exclude reckless misdemeanors from the phrase use of physical force as occurs in nine twenty-one A thirty three. The first is that it's consistent with the definition of use that this court has uh implemented in other cases. Second, it is consistent with the common law definition of battery, and third, it is consistent with the intentionality inherent in domestic violence.
But it's inconsistent with the treatment of Bodily injury. I mean, I think you agree, because the court so held, that either bodily injury or offensive touching Is the act satisfies the act requirement. And you say If there's bodily injury, then reckless Is it not? But If it's only offensive touching, then you need a a higher mental state. intentional, knowing. Why do if if both acts qualify equally? Why shouldn't The same state of mind attached to each.
The same state of mind should attach to each, and that is why intentionality is the state of mind that under the common law can attach to each, because intentional battery covered both. the offensive physical contact as well as the physical injury, whereas Recklessness covers only offen of of uh bodily injury. I'm
sorry. I Intentionality in my mind. Um is misperceived. because you think you're talking about intentionality as the act of causing the injury. But I understood common law battery to be the intentional act that causes the injury. i. e. if a husband threw a bottle at a wife, doesn't intend to hit her. But the bottle smashes against the wall. And the glass embeds itself in her face. Under the common law that would have been a battery because the act the intentional act was to throw the bottle. It wasn't necess it wasn't to cause the injury, but the act caused the injury.
I respectfully disagree, Your Honor.
Under I know, if if we end up disagreeing because the government points to many examples of where this is the case, how do you win?
That's only on injury cases. And so you don't have that same uh confirmation or that same organization of the law with respect to offensive physical contact. And so my clients were convicted of offensive physical contact under a um under the categorical approach, and so at that point. You can't say that they were convicted of anything that caused physical injury.
The point is that the contact was int was intend some contact had to have occurred. Correct. whether there was an act that caused that contact regardless of whether it was intentional or reckless.
The The problem under the common law is that not all touches were considered to be illegal. And so that is why in Johnson this court stated the common law as being the intentional application of unlawful. Well we were
talking about common law battery as it applied to definition as it applied in a domestic setting. So I'm talking only about a domestic setting, which this is.
This is serious, but the problem is is that the government's uh formulation of any reckless conduct satisfying use of physical force is that it's not limited to batteries.
Well the the the mens ray of recklessness could apply to the act of touching or to uh whether the act is offensive. Now under main law w to which of those does it apply? It doesn't necessarily have to apply to both.
Statutorily it does apply to both.
So if someone recklessly touches another person and that is offensive, that's a battery under main under main law?
Yes, Your Honor. And the government cites a case exactly for that per proposition and that's the Gantnier case.
And what happened in that case?
I it was whether the defendant got a um an instruction on the simple battery rather than the uh sexual offensive conduct. And so that the Court reversed it because it said that I it was a proper instruction. No,
I mean what were the facts? What uh what did this person do that was uh involved a reckless touching?
I he went to wake in his stepdaughter, I believe
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s three‑prong argument for excluding reckless misdemeanors from the “use of physical force” definition?
0:00–5:22
2
How do the parties differentiate between bodily injury and offensive touching under the statute?
5:22–11:35
3
Why does the government cite the Gantnier case to argue that reckless offensive touching is a battery?
11:35–17:49
4
What examples (bottle‑throwing, door‑slamming, driving) illustrate the line between intentional and reckless conduct?
17:49–23:57
5
How does the Court interpret “use of physical force” in domestic‑violence contexts versus ordinary assault cases?
23:57–29:21
6
Why does the petitioner argue that Congress intended to cover all assault‑and‑battery statutes, not just intentional conduct?
29:21–36:51
7
What is the role of the rule of lenity and why do the Justices disagree on its application here?
36:51–45:18
8
How does the discussion conclude on whether the statute’s language supports a lifetime gun‑possession ban for reckless domestic‑violence offenses?
45:18–52:24