Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (14-144)
argument 14-144Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the legal basis for treating Texas license‑plate messages as government speech?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-144, John Walker v. the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. Mr. Keller.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Messages on Texas license plates are government speech. The State of Texas etches its name onto each license plate, and Texas law gives the State sole control and final approval authority over everything that appears on a license plate. As in Summa, Texas is not abridging any traditional free speech rights. Motorists remain free to speak in all sorts of ways, including on their cars, through a bumper sticker right next to a license plate or a car-sized paint job or a window decal. But the First Amendment does not mean that a motorist can compel any government to place its imprimatur on the Confederate battle flag on its license plate.
Well, one of the problems with the scheme is its nebulous standards. it would be regarded as offensive to many people. Is it government speech to say mighty fine burgers to advertise a product?
The government, yes, Justice Ginsburg, the government is allowed to choose the messages that it wishes to. And simply because it has approved parochial messages or has endorsed messages or is accepting and generating revenue to propagate those messages doesn't defeat the fact that it is government speech. When the Library of Congress, for instance, takes sponsorship from the Washington Post or Wells Fargo for the National Book Festival, that's still government speech when they then put it on their
website. uh, erected 500 electronic billboards around the state. And on those billboards, they posted some, uh, government messages, uh, wear your seatbelt when you're driving, for example. But then at the bottom, uh, people could put a message of their choice. Would that be government speech? Justice
Alito, I think the portion that the government had final approval authority and sole control over, that would be government speech. If the government, though, doesn't have sole control or final approval authority over another portion, I think that
— No, the bottom. The government has the same kind of approval authority that it has here. It will allow people to say inoffensive things. But if they say something that's offensive, then they won't allow that. That would be government speech.
It would be government speech under, I think, the best reading of both Sumum and Johan's together as precedent, that you have final approval authority and the government isn't abridging other traditional free speech rights. But even if that weren't
— But I'm sorry, I don't understand. Almost anything the government does, it has final authority to veto. And whether it's a school or a government website, it always retains the authority to say no. The issue is, when can it say no? constitutionally. So I don't think it's merely that. And in Sumon, the government actually created the words that were being advertised. So isn't that substantially different? Because the government's not creating these words.
Well, Justice Sotomayor, a few points on Sumon. The Court indicated that the
— That's the Monument case. I'm talking about Johannes.
That's right. In Suam, though, a private organization, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, put its name on the monument. It created the message. It then donated it to the park. In Johan's, yes, the government did create a program to espouse the message, beef, it's what's for dinner. But even then, as the court recognized, the Secretary of Agriculture didn't write ad copies. So it's not as if the government had control. Sorry, the government had control. It just was not... at every step of the way saying, this is how the message must be. But at the end of the day, it had final approval authority. But to return to Justice Alito's hypothetical and what the test should be, The test can include other elements, and even if Suman and Johan's could be read as just a two-part test, for all sorts of reasons, this is government speech here.
Texas has its name on every license plate.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal basis for treating Texas license‑plate messages as government speech?
0:00–7:13
2
How do the justices apply the *Sumum* and *Johannes* precedents to the plate‑design dispute?
7:13–14:47
3
When can the state refuse a specialty plate without violating the First Amendment?
14:47–22:01
4
What standards does Texas use to deem a proposed plate “offensive,” and are they constitutionally permissible?
22:01–28:47
5
Is the license‑plate program a limited public forum, hybrid speech, or pure government speech?
28:47–35:26
6
How do revenue‑generating specialty plates affect the analysis of government versus private speech?
35:26–43:11
7
What would happen if the state allowed all political messages (e.g., “Vote Republican” vs. “Vote Democratic”) on plates?
43:11–51:06
8
What is the ultimate First Amendment outcome the Court is being asked to decide in Walker v. Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans?
51:06–59:36