Warger v. Shauers (13-517)
argument 13-517Warger v. Shauers
Supreme Court of the United States
49 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the central legal issue in Warger v. Shauers regarding Rule 606(b) and McDonough claims?
We have argument next in case thirteen five seventeen, Warger versus Schowers. Mr. Shamb again?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In McDonough versus Greenwood, this court held that a party is entitled to a new trial where it can show that a juror was materially dishonest at Vardir, regardless of whether the juror's dishonesty actually infected the verdict. A McDonough claim is thus an inquiry into the composition of the jury. It is not an inquiry into the validity of the verdict. And for that reason, Federal Rule of Evidence six hundred six B unambiguously permits the introduction of testimony about statements made during deliberations in support of a McDonough claim.
But but was wasn't th that a case in which a third party uh came and and gave the information.
That is correct. And so we are certainly not arguing that McDonough itself resolved the question of the scope of Rule six oh six B. But we do think that the nature of the McDonough inquiry is really critical here in determining whether Rule six oh six B applies. And in particular, we think that the critical fact is that McDonough in no way requires an inquiry into what actually took place in the jury room. It is, as we say in the briefs, a type of structural error, and by that I mean that it has no prejudice component. And in that regard, it is critically different from other types of claims, such as a claim of outright jury bias, where prejudice is required. And it's really for that reason that we think Rule six oh six B unambiguously permits
evidence of this variety to be admitted.
I thought that the whole rationale behind this is we don't want to invade the Jury province with information about what went on in the jury room. And that's a pretty old rule. And some people may think It makes no sense. You can have an eavesdropper. And that's okay, but you can't have a Jura itself. So this W what's involved here is A juror. reporting what she heard during the deliberations. And it seems to me that's exactly the kind of thing that is not permitted.
Justice Ginsburg, we're certainly talking about statements made during deliberations, and we are not disputing that this is the type of evidence that is subject to the rule. Our argument concerns the first requirement of Rule 606B, which goes to the type of inquiry During which evidence that is otherwise covered by the rule would be admissible. And I do think that Rule 606B embodies a balance. It isn't simply about the countervailing policy concerns, which respondent and the government understandably emphasize, of finality and jury secrecy. There is, of course, a countervailing concern here about fairness. That is, after all, the principal concern on which Mm.
But it's too easy to convert. Anything that occurs into the jury room. as reflecting on the board here. So the the judge instructs the jury Can you Follow my instructions. Oh yes, I can follow my instructions. In the jury room. That juror says, Oh, come on, let's just average it all up and go home. Give him didn't follow instructions. I th on your theory, that could come in because it goes to dishonesty at the Bourdieu stage.
So two responses to that, Justice Ginsburg. First of all, as we point out in our reply brief, Our rule has been the rule, both on the federal level and on the state level, in numerous jurisdictions. And we would respectfully submit that there is really no evidence of the floodgates problem that respondents suggests will follow if this court is not a very important thing.
Why not?
Well that goes to my second response, which is that I think that it is going to be very difficult in the hypothetical U posit for a party to make out a successful McDonough claim. And that is simply because the requirements of McDonough are in fact quite stringent. And in particular, the first requirement of McDonough is that the moving party must show that the response was intentionally dishonest. And by that I think that the Court really meant intentionally dishonest at the time of Wardeer. So to take the hypothetical that the government uses in its brief, if
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue in Warger v. Shauers regarding Rule 606(b) and McDonough claims?
0:02–5:41
2
How does the petitioner argue that Rule 606(b) permits admission of juror testimony about dishonesty?
5:41–11:54
3
Why does the petitioner claim that a McDonough claim is a structural error without a prejudice component?
11:54–17:48
4
What distinctions does the petitioner draw between juror bias claims and McDonough claims?
17:48–25:15
5
How do the respondents counter that admitting juror statements would open the floodgates to harassment and undermine jury secrecy?
25:15–30:38
6
What role does congressional intent and the legislative history of Rule 606(b) play in this dispute?
30:38–37:21
7
How do the parties use case law from the Ninth Circuit, California, and the Iowa rule to support their positions?
37:21–43:12
8
What is the petitioner's ultimate request to the Supreme Court and why is it crucial for the outcome of the case?
43:12–50:13