Welch v. United States (15-6418)

argument 15-6418

Welch v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 56 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Supreme Court’s test for distinguishing procedural versus substantive criminal rules?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument first this morning in case fifteen sixty four eighteen. Welch versus United States. Mr. Owley?

Unknown 0:08

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Johnson is retroactive because it is a rule of substantive criminal law, not a procedural rule that regulates only the manner of determining a defendant's culpability or sentence. This court applies a straightforward test for distinguishing between those rules that are procedural and those that are substantive. Assuming perfect trial or sentencing procedures, does the new rule change the authorized outcomes of the criminal process? If no, meaning that a court could have reached the same outcome had it applied perfect procedures, then we're dealing with a procedural rule. Well. What did you do with the The argument that The c the concern that mo motivated Johnson is all procedural.

Unknown 0:54

They have noticed Taking the fan back. a check against arbitrary enforcement. Those are procedural concerns. Yeah, we think under this court's decision in Bowsley, it's clear that you don't look to the source of the rule and that that's not governing. Uh and what's relevant here as it wasn't relevant i in Bowsley is that there was no valid act of Congress which authorized the punishment for a class of persons. Here the class of persons who absent the residual clause would have had two or fewer uh qualifying crimes under ACA. In Bowsley the class of persons were those who merely possessed firearms. But to answer your question more directly, Justice Ginsburg, uh As we explain on page sixteen seventeen of a reply brief, we think it's far from clear, even if that were the test, uh, that vagueness sounds only in procedural due process.

Unknown 1:43

In fact it's qualitatively different, we think, from procedural due process, uh in the sense that it does uh control or regulate which criminal prescriptions Congress can or cannot pass in a way that we don't think of when it comes to procedural due process. So Johnson didn't say government if you provide notice to people or greater notice you can still come after them under the residual clause. What Johnson said was the residual clause is facially unconstitutional. No person may be sentenced to fifteen to life under the residual clause. So what we know now is that people like Petitioner are spending somewhere between an additional five years to the rest of their life in prison based on uh where there was no valid act of Congress which authorized that punishment.

Unknown 2:34

And that we believe is very clearly a substantive rule under Bowsley.

Samuel A. Alito 2:39

Well before you get you continued uh too deeply into the substance of your argument, could I just ask a possibly irritating question about the facts of this particular case. The first question that you raise in the surpetition is whether the district court was in error when it denied relief on petitioner's twenty two fifty five motion. And I mean I wanna If you look at page ninety six A of the joint appendix, the first sentence uh of uh I'm sorry, the uh paragraph eight. on that page. Can you tell me if you were a district court judge? Would you have seen in that argument the argument that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague.

Unknown 3:35

Your Honor, we believe that with liber liberal pro-say pleading standards, that what's set on 96 and what's set on page 83, where petitioner invokes his Fifth Amendment right to due process, combining that with the language here, that uh he does not mean armed meet armed career criminal requirements because it's, quote, ambiguous, vague, and without without any violence, we think that would satisfy, but more importantly, we think that the

Samuel A. Alito 3:59

Well just uh I mean I that is wasn't exactly the question I asked. Um particularly when I was on the Court of Appeals and we reversed the district court judge, they would always complain that, you know, you're asking us to uh you y to Uh y you don't understand our situation. My my question is, if you were a district judge, would you have seen In this sentence, petitioner's robbery under Florida State Statute Section eight, twelve, etcetera, is ambiguous vague and was without any violence and or physical force.