Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. (17-71)
argument 17-71Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 1m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What statutory changes did Congress make to the Endangered Species Act in 1978?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case seventeen seventy one Warehouser Company versus United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Mr Bishop.
Mr Chief Justice, may it please the Court. Congress amended the Endangered Species Act in nineteen seventy eight. to narrow the concept of critical habitat. It did that in response to this Court's decision in Hill and an early regulation that allows critical habitat designation for population expansion beyond a species' present habitat. In the provision that requires designation of critical habitat, section four, Congress limited the services' power to designate to any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat. In section three hundred and five C, Congress commanded that critical habitat shall not include the entire area which can be occupied by a species. And those limitations show that Congress intended
that areas that can be occupied by a species, that is, its habitat, mark the outer bounds, the outer bounds of critical habitat, and it would be perversal. Mr
Bishop, may may I um offer you a hypothetical just to understand the scope of your argument, which is a bit unclear to me. So in my hypothetical there is A species which like this one, is in only a single habitat, and for whatever reason that habitat is no longer going to support the species. Disease has come, a predator has come, it's gotten too hot, it's gotten too cold, whatever it is. that single habitat no longer will be able to support the species. And there is no habitat that at the present moment there is no other habitat that at the present moment is capable of conserving the species over the long term. But there is a habitat that with only slight improvements, what the government calls reasonable efforts,
can support the species, okay? So habitat A, where the species is, no longer any good. Habitat B It can't it can't it won't s uh conserve the species if left just as it is, but it only takes reasonable effort. to conserve the species. Can the government designate that area? as unoccupied critical habitat.
No, it has to be habitat. No Just to be plain. Part of the problem with that is that the government When the government talks about reasonable changes, which what it is what it does here, what would be involved in
on this piece of land. I understand that you think that it's much more than reasonable changes that would be involved here. But I'm in my hypothetical, that's why it's a hypothetical, I'm stipulating that it's it's pretty minimal stuff. It's, you know, um uh d Dig a few holes, plant a few trees, that sort of thing. I don't rule
out that the government might be able to justify uh a critical habitat designation when there are de minimis changes, where you're really only talking about digging a few holes. Where there is a A very Uh minimal change required in the land. That isn't this case. We haven't seen the government's justification for doing that. What happens when you have a reasonable
stick to my hypothetical, which is, you know, maybe something more than de minimis, but but but what what the government views as uh reasonable changes such to allow the land to support the species over the long term. No. No,
we don't think so, Justice Kay again. And why is that? Where in the
statute
do you find that the statute says it in three places? It says uh in section four that only habitat of such species can be designated as critical habitat. But
habitat doesn't mean excuse me. We I'm sorry. We know that habitat doesn't mean just where a species lives. I mean that's that would be the common understanding of the word habitat, but this statute clearly goes beyond that and we know because it says It's also where a stat where a species could live, right? It's out there there are also uh habitats that are outside the geographical area occupied by the species. So we know that the statute is not using the kind of garden variety definition of habitat.
No, I I disagree with that, Justice Kagan. three five C says the critical habitat cannot be designated. beyond the entire area which can be occupied.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory changes did Congress make to the Endangered Species Act in 1978?
0:00–7:18
2
How does the Court use a hypothetical frog habitat scenario to test the scope of critical‑habitat designations?
7:18–14:54
3
What is the legal definition of “habitat” under the ESA and how does it differ from ordinary usage?
14:54–20:44
4
Why do the parties argue about whether “reasonable efforts” can satisfy the habitat requirement?
20:44–28:25
5
How do economic impacts on landowners factor into the critical‑habitat analysis?
28:25–35:22
6
What role does the Secretary’s discretion play in excluding land from critical‑habitat designation?
35:22–43:39
7
Can the government protect the dusky gopher frog through means other than critical‑habitat designation?
43:39–52:59
8
What precedent and statutory language guide the Court’s decision on the Weyerhaeuser case?
52:59–1:01:30