White v. Woodall (12-794)
argument 12-794White v. Woodall
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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Why does the Court say a state prisoner cannot get habeas relief under EDFA without clear federal law?
We'll hear argument next in Case 12-794, White v. Woodall. Ms. Lentz?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, this Court has repeatedly held that a State prisoner cannot obtain habeas relief under EDFA unless the State Court contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established Federal law. In this case, there was no clearly established Federal law. Under any interpretation of Carter, Estelle, and Mitchell- This Court has never extended Carter to the selection phase of a capital sentencing trial. Because there is no clearly established federal law, the Kentucky Supreme Court was well within its authority to resolve this unresolved question in favor of affirming the sentence.
Ms. Lentz, could I ask you about what you just said? You said Carter, Estelle, and Mitchell. Those are the three. So Carter says the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a no adverse inference jury instruction when requested by a defendant. And that was, of course, not a sentencing case. Then Estelle says we discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondents' capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment. So a kind of general view that the Fifth Amendment applies equally in the two. And then Mitchell holds — it basically repeats that from Estelle and says we must accord the privilege the same protection in the sentencing phase of any criminal case as that which is due in the trial phase.
So when you put those together, Carter with Estelle Mitchell, why do you think that there's a gap?
Well, there is a gap between Mitchell and Carter in First of all, Mitchell was not a jury instruction case. In Mitchell, while the defendant did plead guilty, she did not plead guilty to all of the conduct. So there were still factors that were being contested. In this case, Mr. Woodall pled guilty to all of the crimes and aggravating circumstances. Mitchell and Estelle were both concerned with protecting the defendant from the prosecution shifting its burden of proof to the defendant. In this case, there was no burden shifting because Robert Keith Woodall had already pleaded guilty to the facts which the prosecutor was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt to render Mr. Woodall eligible for the death penalty.
Do you think it would have been okay for the trial court to instruct the jury that they could use the defendant's silence against him? Would the affirmative statement have been constitutional and not a violation of the Fifth Amendment?
I do not think it would have been proper. Under Kentucky law, the attorney could not refer
to — No, I didn't ask about Kentucky law. Do you think the Fifth Amendment permits the judge to have said, use silence? No. Use silence to punish him because he's just a bad person. I don't
think so.
In federal law, you don't think the judge could say, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this defendant has already pleaded guilty to a horrible crime. This is a punishment hearing. He has chosen not to testify in this hearing. You are, if you wish, you may take his failure to testify as an indication that he does not have remorse, that he is not sorry. He could have come before you and said, I am terribly sorry. I wish I had never done it. I will never do it again. He has chosen not to testify. You may, if you wish, take that into account in determining whether there is remorse. You can't say that?
Oh, absolutely. Well,
then your answer should have been otherwise.
Well, I guess I interpreted Justice Sotomayor's question a little bit different because she wasn't referring to facts and evidence or to some type of evidence. But your question asks the question about whether silence bears on the determination of a lack of remorse, and Mitchell specifically left that open.
In fact, Mitchell — factual dispute as to how much the witness, the victim, had suffered. How about a statement about
that? Well, I don't think there was actually a dispute about how much the victim suffered there. I think you're referring to the testimony of the blood spatter expert wherein he was talking about how the blood was splattered around and it indicated that there had been quite a struggle there.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Why does the Court say a state prisoner cannot get habeas relief under EDFA without clear federal law?
0:01–7:33
2
How do Carter, Estelle, and Mitchell differ on Fifth Amendment protections in sentencing?
7:33–14:16
3
What is the significance of the Carter instruction and why was it modified in this case?
14:16–21:36
4
When can a jury draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence in a capital sentencing phase?
21:36–28:28
5
Does the lack of a prosecutor objection imply the instruction should have been given?
28:28–36:05
6
How does Mitchell’s ruling affect the application of Estelle to remorse and mitigation?
36:05–44:45
7
What is the impact of the no‑adverse‑inference instruction on the jury’s weighing of mitigating factors?
44:45–52:06
8
Why did the Court conclude there was no clearly established law and the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision was within authority?
52:06–58:27