Whitfield v. United States (13-9026)
argument 13-9026Whitfield v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
53 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the statutory definition of “forced accompaniment” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case thirteen ninety twenty six, Whitfield versus United States. Mr Carpenter?
And may it please the court. The basic bank robbery offence under section twenty one thirteen A requires the robber to use force, intimidation or violence against another person. Section E's forced accompaniment provision is designed for much more extreme conduct that Congress viewed as roughly on par with murder. And yet the government would have that provision and its ten year mandatory minimum apply any time that a robber forces someone to take a single step with him in the course of a robbery. That single step rule isn't justified by the text of the statute. And it isn't necessary to ensure just punishment for bank robbers. In this case,
why why isn't it justified by the text? I I can I can accompany my my my wife to her table when we Go to a dinner party and we're we're seated at different tables. Is isn't isn't it proper to say I I accompany her to the table?
Your Honor, our view is not that it is technically improper, but that it is it would not be an ordinary and natural usage of the word accompany, for example, to say I
just gave you an ordinary and natural use. I accompanied my wife to her table.
Our view is that it is not an ordinary use to say we accompany, for example, from this side of the lectern to this side, which is the amount of movement the government believes is is covered. Or for example to say, Will you accompany me, Justice Scalia, from your chair?
You think there's a spatial component to I mean what I don't understand why you say it's it's not normal usage unless you say uh there is a spatial requirement that you to accompany somebody you have to walk a longer distance. And I the example I just gave you suggests otherwise.
Your Honor, our view the or in the ordinary usage it is used in the sense of going to a destination, to the theater, to the ballpark. But even if there is some question To my
wife's table.
And ev well even if there is some question about whether the or the usage of a just the movement of a few feet is an ordinary usage. where there are multiple possible meanings of a term, we look to the statutory context of the structure.
I'm asking you whether there are multiple possible u I'm listen, I'm very big on the role of lenity. But the condition for it is that there be ambiguity. And uh I I A company means a company. I don't see any spatial component to it. Well you know and the rule here is, you know, garbage in, garbage out. It may be a very foolish statute. But but uh but we apply what uh what Congress thought was not foolish.
Well Justice Scalia, first the order whether there's ambiguity is determined not by looking at the word a company in isolation, but as uh the court said last year in the utility air context or in the utility air case, the words of a statute are interpreted in their context and with a view toward their place in the statutory scheme. Here, the place that the word accompany serves in this statutory scheme is to set off a set of extreme conduct that Congress viewed as roughly on par with murder. Its association in Section E with the killing offence tells us under the Noscador principle that Congress viewed А форс аккомпан акін то мердер,
твані степ. Twenty steps is is horrible enough for Congress to have believed it's enough of an accompaniment? What? Half a mile? What?
Well you know we don't believe there's going to be a bright line rule based on the number of steps or something.
I don't insist on a bright line rule. I insist on some rule. What what what is your what is your rule? Does it have to be outside the building? Does does does the bank robber have to take the person as a hostage outside the building?
We think the best way to effectuate the structure of the scheme is to have a finding of substantiality and we would instruct a jury or a fact finder under a rule twenty nine motion first and foremost to say that a substantial movement is something more than a de minimis or a trivial movement.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory definition of “forced accompaniment” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)?
0:00–6:01
2
How do the parties interpret the ordinary meaning of the word “accompany” and its spatial requirements?
6:01–12:56
3
What is the proposed “de minimis vs. substantial” movement test for forced accompaniment?
12:56–18:36
4
How does the government connect forced accompaniment to the killing provision and the Noscotor principle?
18:36–26:41
5
What concerns are raised about prosecutorial discretion and the ten‑year mandatory minimum?
26:41–32:55
6
Why do the Justices worry that a “single‑step” rule could over‑breadth bank robbery cases?
32:55–39:18
7
How do the parties argue for applying the rule of lenity to this mandatory‑minimum statute?
39:18–46:18
8
What relief are the parties seeking from the Supreme Court on the conviction and sentencing?
46:18–54:11