Wilkins v. United States (21-1164)
argument 21-1164Wilkins v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 5m
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Court’s initial position on whether the Quiet Title Act’s time limit is jurisdictional?
We'll hear argument this morning in Case 21-11-64, Wilkins v. the United States. Mr. McCoy.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, this Court has repeatedly held that when Congress wants to make a time bar jurisdictional, it must clearly state so. In passing the Quiet Title Act, Congress did not clearly state that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Instead, the text, context, structure, and history indicate that Congress intended the statute of limitations to be a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense. In its briefs here, the government does not argue that Congress clearly stated that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Instead, it points to offhand use of the word jurisdiction in this Court's previous Quiet Title Act cases. But jurisdiction is a word of many meanings.
And it wasn't until recently that this Court brought discipline to the use of the term. Prior to that, courts and litigants often used jurisdictional to refer to mandatory but non-jurisdictional time bars and other prescriptions. That is what happened in Block and Motaz. Nothing in those cases indicate this Court was using jurisdiction in the fundamental sense. The issue was not presented to this Court. The parties did not cross swords over it. And the outcome did not turn on subject matter jurisdictions. As a result, whether the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional is an open question, and because Congress did not clearly state it is, courts, including this Court, should treat it as non-jurisdictional.
I welcome the Court's questions.
Mr. McCoy, going beyond the text just for a bit, what do you do with the fact that this statute of limitation occurs in the context of a waiver of sovereign immunity?
Well, Your Honor, as this Court has has said in Wong or as this Court recognized in Beckler last term, a waiver of sovereign immunity is not necessarily a jurisdictional prerequisite. And what this Court has done is it has construed statute of limitations and other time limits when there was a waiver of sovereign immunity strictly, but construing it strictly is different than jurisdictional and whether it is a jurisdictional time limit.
But I think, haven't we been quite careful to treat the conditions to waiver of sovereign immunity as jurisdictional or mandatory?
Well, mandatory, yes, Your Honor, but mandatory is different than jurisdictional. And Beckler was a waiver of sovereign immunity. This Court found that The time bar was non-jurisdictional. It even found that there was equitable tolling in that. And in terms of how this Court has viewed waivers of sovereign immunity, it certainly has strictly construed waivers of time bar. But again, that's a separate question than whether or not it's jurisdictional.
Counsel, you and your friend on the other side both rely on This is the Court's opinion in beggarly. And I'm not sure why it matters to you whether it's a jurisdictional ruling or simply a ruling about equitable estoppel. Either way, I mean, maybe you're right on jurisdiction, maybe you're not right on jurisdiction, but either way you lose because the one thing beggarly was quite clear about was that there was no equitable estoppel. It went through and gave the reasons for that under the Quiet Title Act. What your client is looking for is equitable estoppel because you didn't meet the — satisfy the timeline. But whether you're right in Beckerley about jurisdiction or not, you still lose, right?
No, Your Honor. And in Beckerley, this Court said there was no equitable tolling. But as Justice Stevens recognized in his concurrence, this Court left open the question of whether there is equitable estoppel, which are distinct equitable doctrines that excuse the statute of limitations. But beyond that, whether or not this is jurisdiction, if it's jurisdictional, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving jurisdiction, while if it is a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense, then the government would have the burden of proving.
Yeah, but they're not going to have any trouble carrying that burden because Bakerley says quite clearly that
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Court’s initial position on whether the Quiet Title Act’s time limit is jurisdictional?
0:00–10:02
2
How does the discussion of sovereign‑immunity waivers affect the jurisdictional analysis?
10:02–19:15
3
What role do Block and Motaz play in shaping the Court’s view of the statute of limitations?
19:15–26:38
4
Why does the Court distinguish between a jurisdictional bar and a non‑jurisdictional affirmative defense?
26:38–35:39
5
How do the parties argue about the burden of proof if the time bar is deemed jurisdictional?
35:39–44:05
6
What policy considerations does the Court weigh when deciding if the limitation should be jurisdictional?
44:05–52:18
7
How did the 1986 amendments to the Quiet Title Act influence the Court’s interpretation?
52:18–58:31
8
What conclusions does the Court reach in its closing remarks about stare‑decisis and future cases?
58:31–1:05:46