Williams v. Pennsylvania (15-5040)
argument 15-5040Williams v. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the central due‑process issue raised by the Williams v. Pennsylvania case?
We'll hear argument next in case fifteen fifty forty, Williams versus Pennsylvania.
Mr Lev. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Due process does not allow a district attorney to make the decision to seek the death penalty against the defendant. and then in the same case become a judge of the conduct of the prosecutor who carried out that decision and obtained that result. In this case, at when he was district attorney, Chief Justice Castile made a discretionary individualized decision based upon a review of the facts that in his view death was the appropriate sentence to seek.
Does that make a difference, the nature of his decision? Let's say he had a policy. I think every case in which a defendant is convicted of first degree murder, that we ought to seek the death penalty. And leave it to the jury. Maybe the jury will agree or not. But I am going to seek the death penalty in every case where there is a conviction of first degree murder. Would you have the same recusal problem?
I think there would be, yes. Because that policy itself would be a decision that he makes. Pennsylvania law gives the district attorney. No,
no, I know that. But it's a categorical decision. In other words, he doesn't look at the particulars of that case. He has a policy that he has adopted, whether you think it is a good policy or not, that doesn't depend upon the particular facts, simply on the facts of what the conviction is.
That would still raise due process concerns because that policy would have led to a major decision within the adversary process.
What if the case was simply in the office and he had supervisory responsibility over everything that occurs in the office, but it's a big office? If a question arose, somebody could bring it to him, but there isn't any indication of personal involvement. Would that be enough?
Uh supervisory authority might be enough depending upon the issue. When the issue goes directly towards the conduct of the prosecutions in his office, it implicates the integrity of the office and the reputation of the leadership.
uh i is where this constitutional line is going to be drawn. You want us to get into get pretty deeply into the issue of a constitutional recusal policy for judges. So it's really not enough to just say what happened here was bad. Let's assume that that that is the case. Assume for the sake of argument. I'm not saying one way or the other. But how far does this go? And that's what I'm that's what I'm interested in. So supervisory authority would be enough You said but it depends on the issue. Why would it depend on the issue?
Because the issue uh is directly related to that supervisory authority.
Well what what is the rule then that you are formulating so that we can answer Justice Alito's questions and similar questions? Recusal is required when then fill in the blank.
When the prosecutor has direct personal involvement in a substantial decision in the case and the issue before the court reflects upon that decision.
I I thought that your your particular position was that a judge cannot sit On any case whereas the district attorney He signed on to the death penalty.
That would be, Your Honor, an appropriate decision, an appropriate due process rule for this court to reach, but it's not a rule you need to reach in this case.
Well what short of that is I thought I thought critical element is he was a district attorney. He signed off on the death penalty. Some twenty odd years later he He's a judge, he cannot sit on that case. I thought that was your position.
Our case takes that but also uh looks at the other circumstances of the case. That includes the nature of the issue.
But that's the that's the line drawing
problem.
Why does it matter that it's the death penalty? What if it was not a capital case? But he he
signed the indictment. I I think the death penalty only matters for eighth amendment purposes if it was not a capital case, if he had direct personal participation in the case and faced an issue that was related to that. level of participation that that involvement that he had, that would still be a duplicate.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central due‑process issue raised by the Williams v. Pennsylvania case?
0:00–7:31
2
How does the argument distinguish a district attorney’s policy of seeking the death penalty from case‑by‑case decisions?
7:31–15:35
3
Why is the alleged Brady violation considered pivotal to the recusal debate?
15:35–22:41
4
What role does the passage of time play in determining whether recusal is required?
22:41–30:28
5
How do the parties propose a test for “intolerable probability of actual bias” under Caperton?
30:28–38:10
6
What procedural rules govern recusal motions in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court?
38:10–45:21
7
How might the Court’s decision affect the validity of the panel’s judgment if a judge is recused?
45:21–52:40
8
What are the final arguments and the Court’s next steps in the Williams v. Pennsylvania case?
52:40–1:00:05