Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (13-1499)
argument 13-1499Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the constitutional issue at stake in Williams‑Yulee v. Florida Bar?
We'll hear argument next in case thirteen fourteen ninety nine, Williams
Yulee versus the Florida Bar. Mr Pincus? Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Florida punished a candidate seeking election to judicial office because she signed form letters and a web posting soliciting contributions to her campaign committee, contributions that were completely lawful under Florida law. The First Amendment bars Florida from prohibiting that speech. Threshold question of course is what standard of review? Uh we submit that strict scrutiny applies the standard that was applied by the court below, uh for several reasons. First of all, this is obviously a content based restriction. It turns on the content of the speech. Does it solicit a campaign contribution? Um My friend relies on this court's decision in McConnell uh to justify applying the closely drawn scrutiny standard that has sometimes been applied to campaign contribution limitations.
Uh that standard does not apply uh for several reasons. Suppose The Florida rule. Well simply No face to face. Solicitations. That's it. Yeah. conceived that that would be a valid regulation or would that fall under the First Amendment as well? Well I certainly would concede it in this case, Your Honor, because my client uh didn't engage in any face to face uh solicitations, so that would uh eliminate the sanctions against her.
I think a state could adopt a prophylactic rule prohibiting face to face solicitation, certainly one on one solicitation, and perhaps as some states have done solicitations in larger groups. There might be some applications of that rule that uh were Uh that made that rule invalid as applied. For example, a face to face solicitation of one's relatives that have nothing to do with the judicial system and the state at issue. But I think the First Amendment would certainly allow the adoption of that sort of but the the first amendment would not allow that for the candidate for political office. Exactly. So you are making a a you are recognizing that there's a difference between judicial office that the First Amendment allows the state to do things with respect to the election of judges that it wouldn't allow them to do.
How does the Court decide which standard of review (strict scrutiny vs. intermediate) applies to the Florida rule?
with respect to the election of members of the legislature. Well, I I guess I would amend my answer to say that to that the First Amendment might allow uh a ban on some solicitations on a coercion theory. Let me step back. There are three government interests that have been advanced i in this case by the rule. was ill considered, that is, a ban on face to face solicitation by candidates for judicial office, good or not. And it would it be judged by the same standard as a ban on face to face solicitation by political. I think it would be judged by the same strict scrutiny standard, but I think the interests that the government could advance in support of that restriction in the judicial context, uh one of them doesn't exist in the legislative context, the interest in preventing uh bias or in preserving impartiality, and one the interest in preventing coercion of the
person solicited, I think applies somewhat differently in the legislative context than it does in the judicial context. So I don't want to say that there's no ban on solicitation that would be permissible in the nonjudicial context. There is a federal statute that bans Congress from soliciting members of Congress from soliciting federal employees, for example. But but if you had the statute that you s say would be valid, uh barring face to face discrimination, then you have all uh s sorts of of gradations. What about a personal one on one letter? How is that different? I can just s see the court having to say, well this is what I guess Uh oh under inclusive. And Then if we say, Well personal solicitation.
Uh we can ban that. Then what about a letter to five people and then We're off to the races.
I
think it's a good thing. You have a re a real problem and Determining how to make this Not over or under inclusive. Um I I don't think so, Justice Kenny.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the constitutional issue at stake in Williams‑Yulee v. Florida Bar?
0:01–2:35
2
How does the Court decide which standard of review (strict scrutiny vs. intermediate) applies to the Florida rule?
2:35–6:38
3
What arguments are made about face‑to‑face versus written campaign solicitations for judicial candidates?
6:38–12:04
4
Which three government interests does the State claim justify the solicitation restriction?
12:04–19:27
5
How do the parties distinguish judicial elections from legislative elections on the basis of judicial dignity and impartiality?
19:27–27:10
6
What is the role of coercion and quid‑pro‑quo concerns in evaluating the Florida rule?
27:10–34:33
7
How do statistical data and real‑world practice influence the Court’s view of the rule’s impact?
34:33–42:26
8
What is the final constitutional analysis and why does the Court consider the burden of regulating elected judges?
42:26–59:15