Wood v. Moss (13-115)
argument 13-115Wood v. Moss
Supreme Court of the United States
59 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What factual background does the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the Secret Service’s protest‑repositioning provide?
We'll hear argument this morning in case thirteen eleven five, Wood versus Moss. Mr Gershing Gorn.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Ninth Circuit held that individual Secret Service agents could be held personally liable for their on the spot decision to reposition a group of about two hundred to three hundred demonstrators who were within weapons range of President Bush as he made an unscheduled as he made an unscheduled stop for dinner at an outdoor restaurant patio.
Um So were the pro Bush demonstrators. In fact, the pro Bush demonstrators were across the street. Um Pretty much. at a diagonal to the President. And they were permitted to remain there the entire time. He ha they had a throwing distance of a bomb or a shooting distance as well. So
your Honor, the pro Bush demonstrators were differently situated from the Anti Bush demonstrators in several fundamental respects with respect to the weapons range. There is there was a two story building between the pro Bush protesters and the uh where the President was dining. It's in stark contrast to the open alley. that led down i precisely to the six foot wooden fence behind which the president was dining, which is where the anti Bush protesters were.
That was when at the second move, not the first.
No, Your Honor, at the first move when the President arrived for dinner. The um the the pro Bush protesters were on the north s the anti Bush protesters were on the north side of California Street between third and fourth, and the alley that led right down to the restaurant patio was right there. The they were at the head of the alley. So they were very differently situated from the pro Bush protesters.
Council, I I don't understand uh the government to be making the argument and I Can't understand why it isn't making the argument. Then it doesn't matter. whether there was any intent to suppress антибуш демострації. that in this area as in traffic stops We don't consult subjective інтен. Uh if if If a policeman stops somebody And and say, Oh, you stopped me only because I was coming back from an anti Bush demonstration. We wouldn't we wouldn't listen to that argument. We'd say, did you have a broken tail light or not? If you had a broken tail light, we do not inquire into the subjective intent of the officer. Why is it any different here?
Your Honor, I don't believe we are avoiding the argument that Your Honor suggested. We don't think it's I I think, Your Honor, with respect that we have our position is that it is not clearly established law. That if there were an objectively reasonable
You don't even have to get into that. You don't have to get into clearly established law. It's a very simple case. If you say, was there objectively a reason to move these people? If there was, if you had an ulterior motive that was unconstitutional, We don't inquire into it.
Your Honor, we agree with that. We just have framed it as terms of in terms of clearly established law that if we think along the lines of what this Court said in Reichel with respect to retaliatory arrest, if there is an objectively reasonable um basis for the re for the move, for the repositioning, such as a valid security rationale. It's not clearly established that the presence of animus would be enough to take to raise a case of the money.
Because you have these hypotheticals in the last page of brief. where you say that a complaint could survive a motion to dismiss if the Secret Service members had announced, had admitted that they had an intention to discriminate, or if they had told the local police that. So I took what you were saying there to say if there is evidence of a very clear nature. that it was all about animus and it was nothing about security. then the complaint would survive.
So, Your Honor, I think that the way we reconcile the two positions and is the following. If there is no objective legitimate security rationale, and it is animus, we agree that it would be clearly established law that the officers could not have taken the agents could not have taken the responsibil could not have taken the actions.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What factual background does the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the Secret Service’s protest‑repositioning provide?
0:00–7:22
2
How do the parties argue whether the agents’ actions were based on a legitimate security rationale or viewpoint animus?
7:22–15:16
3
What is the significance of “clearly established law” and qualified‑immunity precedents such as *Reichel* for this case?
15:16–22:42
4
How does Justice Scalia’s hypothetical about mixed‑motive arrests shape the Court’s analysis?
22:42–30:09
5
When do the advocates discuss the applicability of *Iqbal* and the plausibility standard to the complaint?
30:09–37:50
6
What procedural questions arise about discovery, protective orders, and the handling of Secret Service policy documents?
37:50–44:28
7
How do the parties address hypothetical emergency scenarios and the balance between security and First‑Amendment rights?
44:28–51:56
8
What conclusions do the Justices reach regarding the mixed‑motive issue and the appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs?
51:56–59:39