Wooden v. United States (20-5279)
argument 20-5279Wooden v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 4m
10 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “occasions” clause and how does it apply to Mr. Wooden’s case?
We'll hear an argument next in case twenty fifty two seventy nine, Wooden versus United States.
Mr Cadem? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. As its name suggests, the Armed Career Criminal Act singles out the most intractable offenders for the harshest punishments by requiring three qualifying offences committed on occasions different from one another. That phrase does not apply to defendants like Mr Wooden, who commit their crimes in a single criminal episode. Some courts have treated crimes as distinct occasions whenever they're committed sequentially rather than simultaneously. But the government does not defend that rule. Instead, the government would ask whether the final element of each offence was satisfied at the same instant, creating a simultaneity test on steroids. Even the robberies in PETI would flunk that test.
And the government would tack on yet another requirement that crimes must be factually congruent or intertwined as well as simultaneous. Rather than adopt the government's untested, hyper technical approach, this court should read the occasions clause as it would be understood in plain English. Mr Wooden's mini storage break in was a single occasion involving ten burglaries. I would welcome the court's questions.
You seem to uh define uh the uh occasion as a distinct criminal opportunity. Uh how would you uh an how d how are we to analyze that?
Sure. So I think the question is whether it's its own criminal episode, meaning that in order to show that there are different occasions, the government would have to establish some sort of discontinuity or clean break between them. Now, for purposes of this case, it sufficed it suffices to note that an occasion is not an instant. The fact that Samuel Petty and his associates paused for moments in between grabbing the goods of their six different victims did not mean that the robbery in the diner was six occasions.
Well how much time would have to pass or what would have to happen uh in and and to break the occasions up to satisfy you? Sure.
So it's not solely a matter of time or even preliminary uh pro uh primarily a matter of timing. Really it's a a qualitative assessment where at a minimum you know that if all you have is a continuous stream of criminal activity, as in PETI and as in this case, you know that you have the same occasion. For instance, there was never a moment when Mr Wooden and his co uh associates were not committing burglary once they entered the structure until they left it, in the same way that there was never a moment that Samuel Petty and his associates were not committing robbery until they left the diner. Well, I mean
but you're still not getting to what the point. Um what if they took a smoke break? What if they decided to have lunch? What if they said, Look, it's time we we've got lots of time. We can go to Starbucks, grab a uh uh A d a cup of coffee or something like that. Actually Dunkin' Donut or get a cup of coffee or something. I mean and they stay for an hour or two. Is that enough of a break? I'm just trying to figure out what you think a break would be to to to break up the continuity. Sure.
And and just to be clear. Break is perhaps one way that you could have an intervening event. It's not the only one. I think the question is whether, taking into account account all the circumstances in the context, you have the sort of discontinuity where the underlying circumstances has changed. And if you're talking about an activity, for instance, that lasts a matter of hours, a few seconds or minutes in between, is almost never going to be described as a new occasion.
But Mr Cutham, um you uh answered Justice Thomas first by saying it's not only or even primarily a matter of time. And then within two sentences you said the question is whether there's a continuous stream of activity, which does seem like it's a matter of time. So isn't it at least primarily a matter of time? No, Justice
Kagan. And and just to be clear, what I'm saying is that if it is a continuous stream of activity, then you know there's no discontinuity almost by definition.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Armed Career Criminal Act’s “occasions” clause and how does it apply to Mr. Wooden’s case?
0:00–8:22
2
How do the parties define a “criminal occasion” versus a continuous criminal episode?
8:22–16:46
3
What examples (smoke break, moonless night, street‑light) do the Justices use to test the “break” or “discontinuity” standard?
16:46–24:42
4
How does the government’s “simultaneity‑on‑steroids” test differ from the courts of appeals’ circumstance‑based approach?
24:42–32:46
5
Why do the Justices discuss the Sixth Amendment and the risk of vague statutory interpretation?
32:46–40:47
6
What role does lenity play in resolving ambiguous “different occasions” language?
40:47–48:30
7
How do the parties argue about the impact of mandatory minimums on the interpretation of “occasion”?
48:30–56:21
8
What is the Court’s likely conclusion on whether the mini‑storage break‑in constitutes one or multiple occasions?
56:21–1:04:51