Yates v. United States (13-7451)
argument 13-7451Yates v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the Supreme Court’s opening statement about the Yates case?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 13-7451, Yates v. United States. Mr. Badalamenti.
Mr. Chief Justice, it may please the Court. The natural, sensible, and contextual reading of Section 1519 is that the phrase record, document, or tangible object is confined to records, documents, and devices designed to preserve information, the very matters involved in the Enron debacle. Given the expansive Federal nexus of this statute, which is the intent to influence the proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States, it is implausible that Congress would have passed sub-salentio an all-encompassing obstruction statute buried within the altering documents provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A strong textual indicator that Section 1519 is confined to record-related offenses is the inclusion of the unique term makes false entry in, which Congress only uses in record-related statutes.
The canons of Ejusdum Genaris and Nosotor Associis confirm that tangible object is related to the common thread between record and document, which are information devices. Why should
the expression tangible object, which stands alone, it's not falsifying documents, why should the word object in 1519 be treated differently than the word other object in 1512 C?
Justice Ginsburg, in Section 1519, it was passed at the same time as 1512C as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. And as this Court held in Rosello, when Congress includes different terms in different statutes passed in the same Act, it is intended to mean something different.
How does counsel define “record, document, or tangible object” under §1519?
So you think there's a difference between the tangible object and other object?
Yes, there is. The first reason is that the inclusion of makes false entry in indicates that the phrase record document and tangible objects refers to record keeping. Another difference is that a common sense standpoint is that records can only be maintained on tangible mediums, and it's a distinguishing factor between record document and other objects in 1512C. It's
also a limited — How is the Internet — you can falsify Internet entries — For things that are in the cloud, those aren't tangible items.
No, those are tangible items, Your Honor, because these are stored on a hard drive somewhere. The cloud is not existing above. It's merely being housed somewhere else that's accessed through the Internet on a tangible device that's designed to preserve that very type of information.
Suppose a typewriter were used to prepare an incriminating doctor the document and the typewriter were destroyed. Would that be covered?
The typewriter would not be. The piece of paper that the typewriter is inscribing on is a device that's designed to preserve information. It's simply making the information.
I understand the argument, and the argument that you make has considerable force about over-criminalizing. But it seems to me that the test you suggest has almost more problems with vagueness, more problems with – Determining what its boundaries are, then the government's test.
No, the government's test renders 1512C wholly superfluous. 1519, first of all, the words record, document, and tangible object, our definition is providing meaning to all of them. The government is saying, admittedly, record and document didn't need to be there, and Congress had no reason to put them there because it's everything. It's all physical evidence. A tangible object is a discrete device. It is a device that is designed to preserve the information. Well, if
that is the case, then why is it not surplusage? What would be a tangible object designed to contain information that would not fall into the category of record or document?
An iPad, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, an iPhone. Those
things in themselves don't, they have documents, they have something that could be called a document or a record stored in them. If you have an iPad that's straight from the store, has nothing, has no information stored in that, do you think that would fall within the statute?
It would fall within the statute because what Congress was trying to intend to do
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s opening statement about the Yates case?
0:00–1:57
2
How does counsel define “record, document, or tangible object” under §1519?
1:57–8:29
3
Why do the parties argue that “tangible object” should be limited to information‑preserving devices?
8:29–15:45
4
Does storing data in the cloud count as a tangible object for obstruction purposes?
15:45–18:06
5
What example does the court use to illustrate the scope of “record” versus a typewriter?
18:06–27:48
6
How do the parties compare destroying a fish versus a knife under §1519?
27:48–32:50
7
What role do statutory headings and the Model Penal Code play in interpreting §1519?
32:50–51:55
8
Why is the potential vagueness of the statute a concern for prosecutors and judges?
51:55–58:46